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more pronounced in the non-traded sector, driven by both within-firm upskilling and substitution 
from older to newer firms, accompanied by increases in capital stock, and are evident in realized 
employment.  We argue that this evidence reflects the restructuring of production toward more-
skilled workers and routine-labor saving technologies, and that the Great Recession accelerated 
this process. 
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Abstract
We show that skill requirements in job vacancy postings diﬀerentially increased in
MSAs that were hit hard by the Great Recession, relative to less hard-hit areas, and
that these diﬀerences across MSAs persist through the end of 2015. The increases are
prevalent within occupations, more pronounced in the non-traded sector, driven by
both within-ﬁrm upskilling and substitution from older to newer ﬁrms, accompanied
by increases in capital stock, and are evident in realized employment. We argue that
this evidence reﬂects the restructuring of production toward more-skilled workers and
routine-labor saving technologies, and that the Great Recession accelerated this process.
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1 Introduction
The employment shift from occupations in the middle of the skill distribution toward those
in the tails is one of the most important trends in the U.S. labor market over the last 30
years. Previous research makes the compelling case that a primary driver of this job polar-
ization is routine-biased technological change (RBTC), whereby new machine technologies
and overseas labor substitute for middle-skill jobs in the U.S. and are in turn complementary
to high-skill cognitive jobs.1 Until recently, RBTC had been thought to be a gradual, secular
phenomenon. However, a long theoretical literature beginning with Schumpeter's creative
destruction (1939) suggests adjustments to technological change may be more episodic. In
boom times, high opportunity costs, or frictions such as adjustment costs, may inhibit re-
sources from being reallocated optimally in the face of technological change. Recessions lower
the opportunity cost and can produce large enough shocks to overcome these frictions.2
Whether adjustments to new technology are smooth or lumpy is important for policy
and for our understanding of recoveries. The recoveries from the last three U.S. recessions
(1991, 2001, 200709) have been jobless: employment was slow to rebound following the
recession despite recovery in aggregate output. The reasons for jobless recovery are not
well understood, but a small theoretical literature points to adjustment costs as a potential
mechanism, since they generate reallocation that is concentrated in downturns (Berger 2012,
Koenders and Rogerson 2005, Jaimovich and Siu 2012). Such lumpy adjustment may leave a
mass of displaced workers with the wrong skills for new production. Jaimovich and Siu (2015)
provide suggestive evidence that countercyclical reallocation, in the form of RBTC, and
jobless recovery are linked. They show that the vast majority of the declines in middle-skill
employment have occurred during recessions and that, over the same time period, recovery
was jobless only in these occupations. However, there is no direct evidence on how ﬁrms
restructure in the face of technological change, and whether it is gradual or episodic. This
paper aims to ﬁll that gap.
In this paper we investigate how the demand for skills changes over the business cycle. We
use a new data set collected by Burning Glass Technologies that contains the near-universe
of electronically posted job vacancies in 2007 and 20102015. Exploiting spatial variation in
economic conditions, we establish a new fact: the skill requirements of job ads increase in
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) that suﬀered larger employment shocks in the Great
Recession, relative to the same areas before the shock and other areas that experienced
smaller shocks. Our estimates imply that ads posted in a hard-hit metro area are about
5 percentage points (16%) more likely to contain education and experience requirements
1See for example the seminal work of Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003); Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006,
2008); Goos and Manning (2007); and Autor and Dorn (2013).
2Many theoretical papers predict this phenomenon. See for example Hall (1991, 2005); Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994); Caballero and Hammour (1994, 1996); Gomes, Greenwood, and Rebelo (2001); and Koen-
ders and Rogerson (2005).
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and about 3 percentage points (8-12%) more likely to state requirements for cognitive and
computer skills. Drawing on the richness of our data, we show that the majority of this
upskilling is driven by increases in skill requirements within occupations, rather than a shift
in the distribution of ads posted. We also show a similar upskilling eﬀect in employment,
using American Community Survey (ACS) data, suggesting that ﬁrms successfully hire the
more-skilled workers that they seek.
We then examine whether upskilling is driven by changes to production in a manner
consistent with RBTC. In short, are ﬁrms changing what they do or simply changing whom
they hire? Firms may make productivity enhancing improvements in a recession because of
a decline in the opportunity cost of restructuring (Hall 2005), a shift in managerial attention
from growth to eﬃciency (Koenders and Rogerson 2005), or changes in the costs and beneﬁts
of making layoﬀs (Berger 2012, Jaimovich and Siu 2012). In addition, recessions may drive
Schumpeterian cleansing whereby, older, less-productive ﬁrms die, making way for newer,
more-productive ﬁrms. In contrast, upskilling may instead occur because ﬁrms temporarily
and opportunistically take advantage of a slack market to try to attract workers typically
found higher up on the job ladder, with no accompanying changes to production. As our data
are best-suited to measure a shift in demand from middle- to high-skilled workers, rather
than concomitant demand increases for low-skilled labor that also could be expected from
RBTC, we concentrate our evidence on this margin. We present several analyses supporting
the notion that accelerated RBTC brought on by the Great Recession drives upskilling.
First, we show that upskilling persists at nearly the same magnitude from early in the
recovery through 2015. Even though most measures of local labor market conditions have
converged back to their pre-recession levels by the end of our sample period, elevated skill
requirementsespecially higher in the occupational skill distribution where our data are
most comprehensivehave not. Any purely cyclical explanation is thus insuﬃcient. Second,
we show that upskilling is concentrated in non-traded sectors that should be most sensitive
to ﬂuctuations in local consumer demand. Third, we show that upskilling is driven both by
continuing ﬁrms and by new ﬁrms that did not post in 2007, consistent with both Schumpete-
rian cleansing and changes in adjustment costs within ﬁrms. Fourth, we show that within
continuing ﬁrms, upskilling eﬀects are not only persistent, but, among publicly traded ﬁrms
in our data, those with larger increases in skill requirements also had larger increases in cap-
ital stock over the same time period, consistent with a substitution of routine-task workers
with machines. Finally, we rule out that our eﬀects are driven by changes in labor supply
due to unemployment, worker quits, or formal schooling decisions that would lead ﬁrms to
opportunistically hire up.
Taken together, our results suggest that ﬁrms located in areas hit harder by the Great
Recession were induced to restructure their production toward greater use of machines (or
outsourced labor) and higher-skilled workers; that is, the Great Recession hastened the
polarization of the U.S. labor market.
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This paper is related to a number of important literatures. First, we provide direct
evidence that recessions accelerate ﬁrm-level responses to technological change. This is
consistent with the important, but suggestive, evidence provided by Jaimovich and Siu (2015)
that 88% of the job loss in routine-task occupations since the mid-1980s has occurred around
the time of an NBER-dated recession. The direct, demand-side evidence provided in our
paper speaks to the many models in macroeconomics that assume adjustment costs and
predict that recessions will be times of cleansing (Schumpeter 1939, Koenders and Rogerson
2005, and Berger 2012). These models are important for explaining business cycle dynamics,
but have so far lacked strong empirical evidence.
Second, the Burning Glass job postings data provide a unique opportunity to measure
changes in skill requirements both across and within occupations. In contrast, the extant
literature on job polarization has focused on shifts across occupations and has therefore been
unable to ascertain the importance of the intra-occupational margin. We ﬁnd that, in MSAs
that experienced worse employment shocks in the Great Recession, demand for education,
experience, and cognitive and computer skills increase within several diﬀerent occupation
groups, and throughout the skill distribution. We therefore present the ﬁrst evidence, to our
knowledge, that RBTC occurs within occupations in addition to the well-known adjustments
across occupations.
This result helps to clarify work by Beaudry, Green, and Sand (2014 and 2016) and
others documenting the great reversal in demand for cognitive skill. They show that since
2000, cognitive occupations have seen no gains in employment or wages, and that college
graduates have become more likely to work in routine occupations than previously. They
argue that a decrease in demand for cognitive occupations drove college graduates to take
jobs lower in the occupational distribution, squeezing out the high school graduates who
formerly held them. This is something of a puzzle, especially given the common belief that
technological change continues and the fact that more-skilled workers still earn a sizable
premium in the labor market (Card, Heining, and Kline 2013; Card, Cardoso, and Kline,
forthcoming). Because we ﬁnd that upskilling occurs within these occupations as well, we
hypothesize part of the solution to this puzzle is that cognitive workers are being drawn into
(formerly) routine-task occupations as the skill content of these occupations evolves. These
changes make the occupations more-skilled and therefore likely more desirable than before,
although probably still not as desirable as traditional high-skilled jobs.3
Third, we contribute to a growing literature exploiting data on vacancy postings. Al-
though several studies have used aggregate vacancy data, and even vacancy microdata, from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Job Openings and Labor Market Turnover (JOLTS) survey
(see, for example, Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger 2012), these data contain little infor-
3Our analyses, however, do not explain why employment and wages have not grown in high-skill occupa-
tions. Deming (2015) proposes a compelling hypothesis that a rising importance of social skills, especially
in conjunction with cognitive skills, can help account for this fact.
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mation on the characteristics of a given vacancy or the ﬁrm that is posting it. Fewer studies
have used vacancy data that contain information on the occupation or speciﬁc requirements
of the job posted, and these have generally used narrow slices of the data (Rothwell 2014), or
data that are limited to one vacancy source (Kuhn and Shen 2013, Marinescu 2014). To our
knowledge, we are the ﬁrst study to use data based on a near-universe of online job postings
that covers every metropolitan area in the United States.
Fourth, we help answer an important question about the consequences of recessions for
workers. It is well known that low-skilled workers suﬀer worse employment and wage con-
sequences in recessions.4 Evidence from past recessions shows that in downturns workers
are more likely to take worse jobs, relative to their skills.5 Some of this may result because
workers apply to a broader set of jobs, even those for which they would normally be overqual-
iﬁed, when job-ﬁnding rates decline. However, it is also possible that ﬁrms actively seek a
more-skilled worker than they could have attracted in a tighter market, the opportunistic
upskilling mentioned above.6
We ﬁnd some evidence consistent with this opportunistic upskilling: for some low-
skilled occupations, upskilling eﬀects early in the recovery fade by the end of our sample
period. Moreover, additionally controlling for labor availability in the form of the local
unemployment rate and the college-graduate-speciﬁc unemployment rate absorbs a fraction
of our estimated upskilling eﬀects early in the recovery, but not later, and MSAs where college
graduates were particularly hard hit in the recession (and likely are relatively more plentiful
in the job seeking pool) see additional upskilling eﬀects early in the recovery that also fade.
However, the majority of the upskilling eﬀects persist through 2015, several years into the
recovery, and we conclude that cyclical responses to labor market tightness cannot account
for our main results and for upskilling eﬀects across most of the occupation distribution.
Our conclusions contrast with those from a pair of related papers, concurrent with our
analysis, that use a diﬀerent version of our data to examine both relative increases in skill
requirements early in the recovery (Sasser Modestino, Shoag, and Ballance 2016a) and any
subsequent decreases in skill requirements as markets improved (Sasser Modestino, Shoag,
and Ballance 2016b). These papers argue that upskilling in the immediate aftermath of
the Great Recesssion was driven entirely by ﬁrms opportunistically seeking more-skilled
workers in a slack labor market. While our results qualitatively accord with the empirical
ﬁndings of the ﬁrst paper, our more thorough analysis represents a substantial and new
contribution. We examine a longer time horizon and provide a range of analyses that yield
a richer characterization of upskilling and allow us to disentangle potential mechanisms.7
4See von Wachter and Handwerker (2009); Hoynes, Miller, and Schaller (2012); and Forsythe (2016).
5Devereux 2003; Kahn 2010; von Wachter, Oreopoulos, and Heisz 2012; Altonji, Kahn, and Speer 2016.
6There is mounting evidence that ﬁrms at the bottom of the job ladder beneﬁt from increased retention of
their incumbent workforce in a downturn (Moscarini and Postel-Vinay 2012 and 2013, Kahn and McEntarfer
2015), but little is known about hiring dynamics.
7First, in examining data through 2015, and ﬁnding persistent upskilling throughout, we rule out their
purely cyclical explanation that is based upon data from only early in the recovery. Second, we charac-
5
Furthermore, we disagree with the analysis and conclusion of the second paper because the
results are sensitive to a set of idiosyncratic data choices.8
We demonstrate that during the Great Recession ﬁrms changed not only whom they
would hire in the recovery, but how they would produce. Instead of occurring gradually,
with relatively few workers needing to be reallocated at any given time, technological change
was episodic, resulting in a swath of displaced workers whose skills were suddenly rendered
obsolete as ﬁrms ratcheted up their requirements. The need to reallocate workers on such a
large scale may help drive jobless recoveries. It also likely plays a role in the well-noted and
marked decline in male employment-to-population ratios over the past 25 years, especially
since these declines have been stair-step around recessions (Moﬃtt 2012).9 The evidence
provided in this paper is thus integral for understanding worker reallocation, and can help
inform policymakers about the optimal mix during a downturn of worker retraining and
subsidizing job search through unemployment insurance.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the data, while
section 3 summarizes our methodology. Section 4 presents new facts on upskilling as a
function of local labor market conditions and explores heterogeneity in eﬀects by occuption
skill level and sector tradability. Section 5 examines heterogeneity in upskilling within and
between ﬁrms. Section 6 provides a discussion of our results, and section 7 concludes.
2 Data
Our data come from a unique source: microdata from 87 million electronic job postings in the
United States that span the Great Recession (between 2007 and 2015). These job postings
were collected and assembled by Burning Glass Technologies, an employment analytics and
labor market information ﬁrm. In this section, we describe the data and our particular
sample construction. We provide a detailed examination of the sample's characteristics and
representativeness in Appendix A.
terize upskilling throughout the occupation distribution and for a wider set of skills, speaking to recent
developments in the demand for cognitive skill. Third, we show that upskilling is concentrated in non-traded
sectors, which is consistent with our argument of episodic restructuring, and diﬃcult to rationalize with their
opportunistic upskilling argument. Fourth, our ﬁrm-level analysis helps us identify Schumpeterian cleansing
from other adjustment cost models, and conﬁrms accompanied increases in capital stock.
8Notably, they overstate the degree of downskilling during the later recovery by not comparing it to
the overall change in skill requirements from 2007. Additionally, they use only a fraction of available data,
excluding roughly 35% of their weighted ads. Their results are particularly sensitive to this restriction
(based on our own analysis) and their choice to assign equal weight to all counties, regardless of population
or number of ads. Furthermore, the paper's estimates are also sensitive to the use of one unusual year in the
data to demarcate the beginning of the recovery. Section 4 has additional details.
9Supporting the notion that episodic restructuring drives stair-step declines in male employment, Foote
and Ryan (2015) point out that middle-skill workers, the most vulnerable to RBTC, are most at risk of
leaving the labor force when unemployed.
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2.1 Burning Glass Overview
Burning Glass Technologies (henceforth BG or Burning Glass) examines some 40,000 online
job boards and company websites to aggregate the job postings, parse and deduplicate them
into a systematic, machine-readable form, and create labor market analytic products. Thanks
to the breadth of this coverage, BG believes the resulting database captures a near-universe
of jobs that were posted online. Through a special agreement, we obtained an extract from
BG, which covers every MSA in the United States in 2007 and from 2010 through 2015.10
The two key advantages of our data are its breadth and detail. The broad coverage of
the database presents a substantial strength over data sets based on a single vacancy source,
such as CareerBuilder.com. While the JOLTS asks a nationally representative sample of
employers about vacancies they wish to ﬁll in the near term, it is typically available only
at aggregated levels, and contains relatively little information about the characteristics of
vacancies. In contrast, the BG data contain some 70 possible standardized ﬁelds for each
vacancy. We exploit detailed information on occupation, geography, skill requirements, and
ﬁrm identiﬁers. The codiﬁed skills include stated education and experience requirements, as
well as thousands of speciﬁc skills standardized from open text in each job posting.11 The
data thus allow for analysis of a key, but largely unexplored, margin of ﬁrm demand: skill
requirements within occupation.12 Moreover, they allow for a ﬁrm-level analysis, which, as
we show below, is key to disentangling mechanisms for upskilling.
However, the richness of the BG data comes with a few shortcomings. Notably, the
database covers only vacancies posted on the Internet. Even though vacancies for available
jobs have increasingly appeared online instead of in traditional sources, such as newspapers,
one may worry that the types of jobs posted online are not representative of all openings. In
Appendix A, we provide a detailed description of the industry-occupation mix of vacancies
in BG relative to other sources (JOLTS, the Current Population Survey, and Occupational
Employment Statistics), an analysis of how it has changed over our sample period, and
various validity checks conducted on the data both by us and by other researchers. To brieﬂy
summarize, although BG postings are disproportionately concentrated in occupations and
industries that typically require greater skill, the distributions are relatively stable across
10The database unfortunately lacks postings from 2008 and 2009. Our extract was provided in February
2016. We also have data on jobs posted in Micropolitan Statistical Areas, which we do not use for lack of
some of the labor market indicators in these areas, and substantial noise in the ones that are available. They
represent 5.6% of all posted ads.
11For example, an ad might ask for a worker who is bilingual or who can organize and manage a team.
BG cleans and codes these and other skills into a taxonomy of thousands of unique, but standardized
requirements. Beginning with a set of pre-deﬁned possible skills, BG searches text in an ad for an indication
that the skill is required. For example, for team work, they search for the key words team work but also
look for variations such as ability to work as a team.
12Other private-sector ﬁrms, such as Wanted Analytics, used by the Conference Board's Help-Wanted
Online Index, also oﬀer disaggregated data, but not skill requirements. State vacancy surveys, conducted
by a limited number of states, sometimes collect certain skill requirements, but cover only a few geographic
areas and are generally not comparable across states.
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time, and the aggregate and industry trends in the quantity of vacancies track other sources
reasonably closely.13
The data contain the occupation of the posting (at the 6-digit Standard Occupation
Classiﬁcation 2010 (SOC) level) and codes identifying the MSA where it is located. Burning
Glass also collects the ﬁrm name, if available, for a given posting. Employer name is missing
in 40% of postings, primarily from those listed on recruiting websites that typically do not
list the employer.14
We restrict our main sample to ads with non-missing employers that posted at least
10 ads over the sample period of 2007 and 2010-2015. After cleaning, our data contain
130,440 distinct employers.15 Many of our analyses exploit ﬁrm-level information to distin-
guish among possible mechanisms for upskilling. We therefore choose to focus our entire
analysis on the consistent sample of ads with non-missing ﬁrms, with a suﬃcient number
of observations per ﬁrm to estimate ﬁrm-level characteristics. However, we have performed
analyses not requiring ﬁrm-level information on the full data set and obtain very similar
results. Moreover, as we discuss later, we have conﬁrmed that the probability of satisfying
this sample criterion (having a valid ﬁrm identiﬁer) does not vary over the business cycle.
Thus, our sample restriction should not confound the estimated relationship between local
labor market conditions and the skill requirements of postings.
2.2 Skill Requirements in Burning Glass
In our analyses, we exploit four categories of skill requirements: stated education and ex-
perience requirements, stated demand for skills that we classify as cognitive, and stated
demand for computer skills. The RBTC literature emphasizes that new information tech-
nology or cheap overseas labor substitute for routine, algorithmic, middle-skill tasks. These
new technologies are in turn complementary with high-skill cognitive, abstract tasks and
may indirectly aﬀect low-skill, manual tasks. However, a downside of the BG sample is that
low-skill jobs are underrepresented. We thus focus our analysis on the former margin, the
degree to which employers shift demand from medium- toward high-skill tasks and workers.
High-skilled workers favored by RBTC may be required to work with computers and per-
form a more versatile set of functions. Indeed, the non-algorithmic tasks that complement
routine-task performing machines or overseas labor, involve more complexity, problem solv-
ing and analytical skills, and the ability to determine which tasks need to be performed at
13BG deduplicates multiple postings for the same vacancy. It is important to note that although BG's
parsing algorithm has changed over time, each iteration is applied to all postings data, so our data set is
consistent over our sample period.
14When name is available, Burning Glass uses a proprietary algorithm to group name variants into a
standard set: for example, Bausch and Lomb, Bausch Lomb, and Bausch & Lomb would be grouped
together. We also perform some additional cleaning on ﬁrm name, removing any remaining punctuation and
a few problematic words, such as Incorporated (sometimes listed as Inc).
15The 10-ad restriction drops about 4% of job ads that list a ﬁrm name. However, employer names with
very few ads are likely to be miscoded (for example, capturing a fragment of the city name).
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a given moment.
In accord with human capital theory, we believe more-educated workers or those with
some amount of experience on the job will be better able to perform these functions.16 In
Appendix A.3, to cross-validate the data, we show that education requirements strongly
correlate with average education levels of employed workers at the MSA and occupation
levels.
We categorize cognitive and computer skill requirements based on the open text ﬁelds for
skills. We designate an ad as requiring computer skills if it contains the key word computer
or it is categorized as software by BG.17 We deﬁne cognitive skill requirements based on a set
of key words associated with non-routine analytical tasks, using the taxonomy developed by
Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) and subsequently used by the majority of papers studying
RBTC and polarization. We also ensure that the presence of these key words correlates with
external measures of cognitive skill at the occupation level.18
This set of skills (education, experience, cognitive, and computer) aligns well with our
priors on how jobs change with the availability of computers (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2011).
For example, a sales person who previously devoted most of his or her energy to client
relations may now be required to use data analytics to better target packages to clients.
This salesperson now needs computer and analytical skills, and some experience in the ﬁeld
may help in mapping data recommendations to practice. Similarly, thanks to machine vision
technology, a quality control operator no longer need spend his or her time measuring and
identifying the shapes of produced goods , but instead can be diverted to other tasks such
as troubleshooting and making judgement calls in design optimization. This set of tasks
requires higher cognitive function and intuition that can be gained by experience.19
Table 1 summarizes data for the primary regression sample.20 In 2007, 34% of the
16In the raw data, there are two ﬁelds each for education and experience requirements: a minimum level
(degree or years of experience) and a preferred level. Postings that do not list an education or experience
requirement have these ﬁelds set to missing. We use the ﬁelds for the minimum levels to generate variables
for the presence of an education or experience requirement as well as the number of years of education or
experience required; the minimum is much more commonly speciﬁed than the preferred, and it is always
available when a preferred level is listed.
17BG includes common software (e.g., Excel, PowerPoint, AutoCAD), as well as less common software
and languages (e.g., Java, SQL, Python).
18Specically, an ad is categorized as requesting a cognitive skill if any listed skills include at least one of the
following phrases: research, analysis, decision, or thinking. The fraction of ads at the occupation level
that contain each of these skills is strongly correlated with an O*NET measure developed by Joe Altonji
meant to categorize cognitive occupations. This check is important. For example, we ﬁnd that presence
of the phrase problem solving, which is often associated wtih non-routine tasks, is uncorrelated with the
O*NET measure, and is instead present at high frequency in all kinds of posts. Deming and Kahn (2016)
also use these measures to study ﬁrm heterogeneity in skill demands.
19It has been suggested by Deming (2015) and others that machines and overseas labor complement workers
with interpersonal skills, since machines are still poor at reading and inferring human emotion. We have
also analyzed changes in demand for a composite social skill requirement and obtained results very similar
to those presented here on cognitive and computer skills.
20In the top two panels, observations are weighted as they are in our regression analyses: we give equal
weight to ads within an MSA-year, but upweight larger MSAs, based on the size of the labor force in 2006.
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weighted ads list any education requirement (column 1, row 1). Among ads with an edu-
cation requirement, half (17% of all ads) specify minimum education of a bachelor's degree,
another quarter ask for a high school diploma, and the remainder are roughly evenly split
between associate degrees (not shown), master's degrees, and professional degrees or PhDs.
Converting the degrees to their modal equivalent years of schooling, the average education
requirement, conditional on one being speciﬁed, is nearly 15 years.
The second column shows skill requirements averaged over 20102015. The third column
shows the within-MSA change in skill requirements across the two sample periods, and indi-
cates statistical signiﬁcance. The share of ads specifying an education requirement increased
by 23 percentage points (ppts), on average. This is roughly evenly split across ads requiring
high school and ads requiring college; because the proportional increase is slightly larger for
high school, the overall (conditional) years of schooling falls slightly. All diﬀerences in means
are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Experience requirements follow a very similar pattern to education requirements. In 2007,
almost one-third of ads specify some amount of experience in the ﬁeld. Among ads with a
requirement, the vast majority ask for less than ﬁve years, with much of the remainder
asking for between ﬁve and 10 years. Conditional on posting an experience requirement,
the average ad asks for 3.5 years. In the later time period, the propensity to specify an
experience requirement increases by 20 ppts. These increases are again concentrated in the
lower categories so that the average, conditional on specifying any requirement, falls by about
one-ﬁfth of a year.
Finally, in 2007, 73% of weighted ads specify at least one speciﬁc, text-based skill re-
quirement. Among these, more than one-sixth specify a cognitive skill requirement, and
more than one-quarter have a computer requirement. In 20102015, 91% of ads have at least
one text-based skill requirement, and the shares specifying cognitive skills or computer skills
increase to roughly one-quarter and two-ﬁfths, respectively. In regression analyses, we use
the probability of posting a cognitive or computer skill requirement, conditional on posting a
speciﬁc text-based skill, as dependent variables, rather than the unconditional probabilities,
which might instead pick up a tendency for ads to become more verbose as postings costs
decline.
These increases in stated skill demand could be driven by the national recession that took
place between 2007 and the 20102015 period, which would be consistent with our hypothesis.
However, they could also be driven by a variety of other factors, such as changing composition
of ﬁrms posting ads online or pre-existing national trends. Because of these issues and the
relatively short panel we have to work with, our regression analyses always control for year
dummies. We therefore fully absorb the overall change in skill requirements illustrated in
table 1. Instead, we identify diﬀerences in the change in skill requirements across metro
areas as a function of how they weathered the Great Recession.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
2007 2010-15 Change
Education Requirements:
Any 0.34 0.57 0.23***
(0.06) (0.05)
HS 0.09 0.20 0.10***
(0.03) (0.05)
BA 0.17 0.27 0.10***
(0.05) (0.08)
>BA 0.03 0.05 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01)
Years, Conditional on any 14.84 14.66 -0.18***
(0.40) (0.44)
Experience Requirements:
Any 0.32 0.52 0.20***
(0.06) (0.07)
0-3 0.13 0.24 0.11***
(0.03) (0.03)
3-5 0.14 0.21 0.07***
(0.03) (0.04)
>5 0.05 0.08 0.03***
(0.02) (0.04)
Years, Conditional on any 3.52 3.34 -0.18***
(0.47) (0.54)
Skill Requirements:
Any Stated Skills 0.73 0.91 0.18***
(0.05) (0.04)
Cognitive, conditional on any 0.17 0.23 0.07***
(0.05) (0.06)
Computer, conditional on any 0.27 0.39 0.11***
(0.06) (0.08)
share of ads in 2010-2015:
Missing ACS match 0.08
Continuing firm-MSA 0.54
In Compustat, among continuing 0.47
Mean Min Max
# MSAs 381
Posts per MSA-year 21,507 132 1,198,662
# Occupations (4-digit) 108
Posts per occupation-MSA-year 225 1 189,642
# Firms 130,440
Posts per Firm-MSA-year 14 1 16,413
mean (sd) in:
Notes:  Burning Glass data 2007 and 2010-2015. Sample is restricted to ads with non-
missing firms that posted at least 10 ads over our sample period. In the top, observations are 
weighted by the size of the MSA labor force in 2006. Missing ACS match is the share of 
observations to MSAs that cannot be matched to the American Community Survey (weighted 
by the MSA labor force). Continuing firm-MSAs are firm-MSAs that post in 2007 and 2010-
2015 and In Compustat among continuing are the sharing of continuing firm-MSAs that can 
be matched to compustat. Both statistics are calculated weighting by the firm's ad share in 
the MSA-year times the size of the MSA labor force in 2006. *** indicates means are 
statistically significantly different from each other at the 1% level.
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3 Methodology
We estimate regressions of the form speciﬁed in equation (1), where skill is any of several
measures of the average skill requirements (discussed in more detail below) in MSA m, and
year t (2010 ≤ t ≤ 2015), shockm is a measure of the local employment shock generated by
the Great Recession, I t are year dummies, Xm is a vector of MSA controls, and εmt is an
error term.
(1) skillmt − skillm07 = α0 + [shockm ∗ I t]α1 + I t +Xmβ + εmt.
The regression thus estimates the impact of the local employment shock generated by the
Great Recession on the change in skill requirements for a given MSA between 2007 and each
year of 2010 through 2015. Such a speciﬁcation allows us to empirically investigate the timing
and persistence of upskilling in relation to local labor market shocks. It also accords with
several macroeconomic models that predict that productivity-enhancing improvements will
be more likely to take place in recessions. In the classic Schumpeter (1939) cleansing model,
this would occur because low-productivity ﬁrms shut down in the recession and resources
are reallocated to new ﬁrms with more modern production.21 In addition, several classes
of models can rationalize episodic restructuring within surviving ﬁrms as well. A negative
product demand shock lowers the opportunity cost of adjusting production (Hall 2005), may
shift managerial attention from growth to eﬃciency (Koender and Rogerson 2005), changes
the costs and beneﬁts of making layoﬀs (Mortensen and Pissarides 1994, Berger 2012),22 and
alters incentives to invest in human capital (Jaimovich and Siu 2012).
The key explanatory variable, shockm, is the MSA-speciﬁc change in projected year-over-
year employment growth from 2006 to 2009, the national peak and trough years surrounding
the Great Recession. We project employment growth in an MSA based on its employment
shares in 3-digit NAICS industry codes in 2004 and 2005 and national employment changes
at the 3-digit industry level. This type of shift-share method is sometimes referred to as
a Bartik shock, following the strategy of Bartik (1991).23 We use the Bartik measure,
21See also Caballero and Hammour (1994, 1996) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
22Though not formalized, a suﬃciently large negative product demand shock could make layoﬀs worthwhile,
oﬀsetting any stigma or losses in terms of ﬁrm-specic human capital.
23Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne Bartik employment growth as
∑K
k=1 φm,k,τ (lnEkt − lnEk,t−12), where for K 3-
digit industries, φ is the employment share of industry k in MSA m at time τ (in practice, the average
of 2004 and 2005), lnEkt is the log of national employment in industry k in year-month t, and lnEkt−12
is the log of national employment in industry in the same calendar month one year prior (both seasonally
adjusted). We obtain national employment for each 3-digit industry from Current Employment Statis-
tics. We construct φ using County Business Patterns data and the algorithm of Isserman and West-
ervelt (2006) to overcome data suppressions; the resulting county-level statistics are mapped to MSAs
using the deﬁnitions provided by the Census Bureau and set by the Oﬃce of Management and Budget.
See http://www.census.gov/population/metro/data/def.html. Other papers utilizing Bartik shocks include
Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Notowidigdo (2013). The measure may be used directly as a regressor
(reduced-form) or as an instrument for observed employment growth; in practice, this choice often does not
matter much, and that is also true in our case.
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instead of actual employment growth (as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics), for
two reasons. First, actual employment growth at the MSA level is measured with substantial
error, while the Bartik measure allows for more precision. Second, actual employment growth
will reﬂect shocks to labor demand as well as other city-speciﬁc shocks, including those to
labor supply, which may be problematic.24 We note that other direct measures of local
labor market tightness, such as the local unemployment rate, have similar shortcomings in
terms of measurement error or reverse causality; for instance, an unemployment rate may be
high precisely because a sudden demand shift toward more-skilled labor generates structural
mismatch.25
The variable shockm is ﬁxed at the MSA-level for our entire sample period, and we
examine its impact on the change in skill conditions for each year 20102015 through an
exhaustive set of year interactions. Since we control for year ﬁxed eﬀects (I t), we identify
the key coeﬃcients, α1, purely oﬀ of diﬀerences across metro areas in the employment shock
generated by the Great Recession, rather than relying on the national shock itself. As
noted above, this is a necessity given our short panel. We would have diﬃculty separately
identifying coincident national trends, such as changes in the use of online job boards. The
calculated values of shockm range from about =0.12 to =0.04 across MSAs, but to make
the coeﬃcients easier to interpret, we renormalize this variable so that a one unit change is
equal to the diﬀerence between the 10th and 90th percentile MSAs, =0.026 log points.26
The ﬁrst-diﬀerence speciﬁcation implicitly controls for diﬀerences across MSAs in posted
skill requirements. Although our cross-sectional identiﬁcation does not identify MSA ﬁxed
eﬀects in the change in skill requirements, we do control for a wide range of MSA character-
isticsincluding demographics, educational attainment, and economic indicatorsobtained
from the American Community Survey (ACS), averaging years 2005 and 2006.27 These con-
trols help adjust for diﬀerences across MSAs in their preexisting tendency to upskill, to the
extent that such a tendency is correlated with the skill distribution of the population or the
health of its economy before the Great Recession.
In order to understand changes in skill requirements both within and across ﬁrms and
jobs, we disaggregate our data to estimate changes in skill requirements within occupation-
24For example, MSAs with secular increases in population due to migration ﬂows may experience em-
ployment changes that are higher than average but still have a weakening labor market. The Bartik shock
addresses this issue.
25Nonetheless, our estimates are qualitatively robust to using actual employment growth or the unemploy-
ment rate, although magnitudes are somewhat reduced, likely for the reasons indicated.
26Note, this normalization also implies that a larger value corresponds to a worse employment shock.
27We chose years just prior to the Great Recession that allow for MSA identiﬁcation (prior to 2005, the
ACS lacks substate identiﬁers). Speciﬁcally, we include the share of the population that is female, black,
Hispanic, Asian, married, migrated in the last year, is a high school drop out, has exactly a high school
diploma, has some college, has exactly a bachelor's degree, is enrolled in school, is less than age 18, is age
1929, is age 3039, is age 4049, and is age 5064. We also control for the employment-to-population ratio
and the average weekly wage of full-time workers. We can match all but 8% of weighted ads to the ACS (see
the middle panel of table 1), with unmatched ads consisting of small MSAs. In such cases, we set the ACS
controls to zero and include an indicator for not matching.
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MSA, sector-MSA, ﬁrm-MSA, and ﬁrm-occupation-MSA cells. We categorize occupations
based on 4-digit SOC codes.28 These analyses are described in more detail below.
We cluster standard errors by MSA to address possible serial correlation within an area.29
Finally, we weight observations in this regression by the size of the MSA labor force in 2006.
This weighting scheme allows us to upweight areas with larger populations, helping with
precision, while ﬁxing the weight applied to each MSA-year. The latter ensures that we
identify oﬀ of the same MSA weighting mix in each year, regardless of the overall changes
in ads posted.30
From the bottom panel of table 1, we estimate these regressions using all 381 MSAs, which
contain an (unweighted) average of 21,507 posts per MSA-year. When we disaggregate to
the four-digit occupation level, we have 108 occupations represented, with an average of
225 posts in each occupation-MSA-year. Finally, as noted above, our data contain 130,000
unique ﬁrms, which translate into an average of 14 posts in each ﬁrm-MSA-year.
4 Skill Requirements and Local Employment Conditions
4.1 Main Results
Figure 1 summarizes regression results from equation (1) for our four main dependent vari-
ables: the change in the share of ads posting any education requirement, any experience
requirement, any cognitive requirement, and any computer requirement. The ﬁgures plot
the estimated impact of the Bartik shock on the change in skill requirements for each year,
relative to 2007 (coeﬃcients α1), as well as 90% conﬁdence intervals.
Beginning with the top left panel, we ﬁnd that the probability of specifying any education
requirement increases by 5.4 ppts, relative to the average requirement for ads posted in the
same MSA in 2007, for an MSA experiencing a large employment shock (90th percentile),
compared to an MSA experiencing a small shock (10th percentile). This increase is 16% of
the average requirement in 2007 and is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The eﬀect persists at
fairly similar magnitudes and signiﬁcance levels for subsequent years, with a small dip in
2012. In 2015, we estimate that the probability of posting an education requirement is still
4.1 ppts larger than it was in 2007 for a hard-hit MSA, compared to a less hard-hit one.
That is, 76% of the initial upskilling eﬀect in 2010 remains ﬁve years later. Estimates in
each year except 2012 are signiﬁcant at the 1% level.31
28We choose the 4-digit occupation aggregation primarily to save on computation time, but also to ensure
larger cell sizes. Results are robust to disaggregating to the 6-digit level.
29We have also estimated regressions clustering at the MSA-date level, which is the level of variation
underlying α1, and obtain substantially smaller standard errors.
30When we disaggregate across occupations, sectors, and/or ﬁrms within MSAs, we weight by the product
of the MSA labor force and the ad share of the occupation, sector, ﬁrm, or ﬁrm-occupation in an MSA-date.
Because of our weighting scheme, the more aggregate regressions produce results identical to those using
more disaggregated data when the underlying speciﬁcation is the same.
31As we reported in footnote 8, Sasser-Modestino et al. (2016b) ﬁnd evidence of downskilling in education
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Figure 1: Skill Requirements and the MSA-Speciﬁc Employment Shock
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Graphs plot coefficients on MSA employment shock interacted with year, and 90% CI's (dashed lines).
Regressions also control for year fixed effects and MSA characteristics.
The remaining panels of ﬁgure 1 exhibit remarkably similar patterns in both magnitudes
and statistical signiﬁcance. The probability of listing an experience requirement increases
by 5.0 ppts (16%), and 85% of this increase remains in 2015. The probability of listing a
cognitive requirement increases by 2.0 percentage points (12%), and the gap across cities
widens slightly by 2015. Finally, the probability of listing a computer skill requirement also
increased by roughly 2 ppts and remained elevated through 2015.
Appendix ﬁgure D1 summarizes results for additional education and experience outcomes
in order to understand changes in the intensive margin for these requirements. In ﬁgure
D1a, there are similar-sized eﬀects for increases in the probability of requiring a high school
diploma and a bachelor's degree. These increases oﬀset each other, resulting in no overall
change in the years of education required, conditional on posting any requirement. Also,
there is no change in the propensity to require a graduate degree. In some ways this is
reassuring, since many professional jobs, such as lawyers and professors, always require higher
degrees; these requirements would not change with improvements in technology. Figure
and experience requirements as local labor market conditions improved between 2010 and 2014. Their use of
a ﬁrst-diﬀerence speciﬁcation examining changes from 2010 to 2012 and from 2012 to 2014 makes their results
quite sensitive to the choice of the intermediate year, and their ﬁnding of downskilling comes entirely from
the small downward blip in 2012. This blip is even larger in magnitude in the subset of data they use: they
exclude all but the largest six-digit-occupation-by-county cells (omitting roughly 35% of weighted postings),
and this exclusion is exacerbated by their choice to weight counties equally, regardless of population or
number of postings. The more careful picture generated by using all available data, as captured in ﬁgure 1,
provides strong evidence that the vast majority of the increase in skill requirements in locations hit harder
by the Great Recession remains through 2015.
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Figure 2: Labor Market Variables and the MSA-Speciﬁc Employment Shock
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Graphs plot coefficients on MSA employment shock interacted with year, and 90% CI's (dashed lines).
Regressions also control for year fixed effects and MSA characteristics.
D1b exhibits a similar pattern for experience requirements. We see increases in both low
experience requirements (2 years or less) and middle requirements (35 years). Beyond
that we see little change. Again, this results in little change overall in the distribution of
requirements, conditional on posting any.
For contrast, ﬁgure 2 summarizes estimates of equation (1) for a range of local labor
market statistics as dependent variables.32 The top left panel shows the unemployment rate,
and our estimate implies that a hard-hit MSA (90th-percentile Bartik shock) experiences an
increase in the unemployment rate between 2007 and 2010 that is 2 ppts greater than a less
hard-hit MSA (10th percentile). Over time, the impact of the shock declines in magnitude,
and by 2015, unemployment rate diﬀerentials across MSAs have converged back to their
pre-recession levels. We ﬁnd similar convergence in employment levels (top right panel).33
The bottom left panel shows employment-to-population ratio (epop) estimates, which run
only through 2014 because of data availability. We ﬁnd that a hard-hit MSA experiences a
1.25 ppt larger decline in its employment-to-population ratio in 2010, and only about 15% of
32MSA unemployment rates and employment are obtained from the BLS Local Area Unemployment Statis-
tics and Current Employment Statistics programs, respectively. Employment-to-population ratios are based
on the authors' calculations from the ACS. At the time of this writing, ACS data for 2015 had not been
released.
33That is, we ﬁnd that the portion of unemployment rates and employment predicted by Bartik em-
ployment growth converged back to their pre-recession levels by 2015, holding constant pre-recession MSA
characteristics. Actual diﬀerences across cities were somewhat slower to converge.
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this gap had narrowed by 2014.34 There could be many reasons for this lack of convergence.
For example, rapid adoption of new technologies in hard-hit MSAs over this time period
could render a swath of worker skills obsolete, inducing labor force exit (also see Foote and
Ryan 2015). This could be especially true among older workers for whom retraining may
not be worthwhile. Alternatively, it could also reﬂect our age controls not fully capturing
retirement eﬀects from aging baby boomers. We thus also provide estimates using the epop
among the prime-aged population (age 2555) in the bottom right panel. Here we see similar
initial eﬀects in 2010 but ﬁnd that two-thirds of the gap across cities had converged by 2015.
Clearly, MSA labor markets had not fully recovered from the Great Recession by the
end of 2015. Yet, on most measures, there was substantial progress after 2010, with cities
moving closer to their pre-recession diﬀerences. At the same time, in ﬁgure 1 we see almost
no convergence in skill requirements.
Appendix tables D1a and D1b provide some robustness checks to the main skills results
in ﬁgure 1, including accounting for the labor market variables just shown and applying
diﬀerent sample restrictions. Results underlying ﬁgure 1 are shown in column 1. In column
2, we additionally control for the change in the MSA unemployment rate in each year, relative
to 2007, and the change in the unemployment rate for college graduates. These controls help
address an important alternative hypothesis for the upskilling eﬀects we ﬁnd: ﬁrms may
become pickier when labor, and especially skilled labor, becomes more plentiful.35 If our
estimates are driven by opportunistic search behavior on the part of ﬁrms, they should load
on the unemployment rate variables that represent time-variation in the availability of skill.
We ﬁnd that including these controls does slightly reduce the impact of the Bartik shock
early in the recovery (by about a ﬁfth) for education and experience requirements, but that
they have no eﬀect on coeﬃcients later in the sample period. This is intuitive and is driven
by the fact that unemployment rates have converged back to their pre-recession levels by the
end of the sample period, while skill requirements have not.
Column 3 of appendix tables D1a and D1b present the baseline results using the full
sample of ads, including those with missing ﬁrm names. (As mentioned above, we focus on
the 60% of ads that contain ﬁrm name because this sample allows us to later distinguish
among mechanisms for upskilling.) One might be concerned, for example, that ads with ﬁrm
names have diﬀerentially changing skill requirements relative to ads without ﬁrm identiﬁers,
perhaps due to ﬁrm size or prestige. However, results on the expanded sample are quite
similar to those in ﬁgure 1 for all dependent variables.36
Thus, there is considerable evidence that MSAs with more severe labor demand shocks
34These ﬁndings are consistent with Yagan (2016) who uses IRS tax data to show that while unemployment
rates had converged aross U.S. commuting zones following the Great Recession, employment probabilities
had not, holding constant a rich set of worker characteristics.
35Or, as in Menzio and Shi (2011), ﬁrms become temporarily pickier in a recession because of the negative
productivity shock.
36We also ﬁnd no systematic relationship between the change in the share of ads with a missing ﬁrm and
our key explanatory variables. See column 1 of appendix table D2.
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Figure 3: Relative Employment by Skill and the MSA-Speciﬁc Employment Shock
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Based on Census and ACS data from 2000, 2005-2014. Graphs plot coefficients on MSA  shock interacted with year, and 90% CI's (dashed lines).
The top three panels show the change in relative employment rates (compared to dropouts) for high school graduates, some college,
and at least a BA, respectively. The bottom right panel shows the change in the average experience level of employed workers.
Regressions also control for a time trend.
during the Great Recession experienced larger and more persistent increases in the skill re-
quirements of their job postings. Of course, stated preferences for skill are not necessarily
reﬂected in realized employment. For example, given the relatively low cost of advertising
electronically and the weak labor markets in 2010 and 2011, ﬁrms might post high skill
requirements to gauge the available pool of labor, without necessarily expecting to immedi-
ately ﬁll a position. Moreover, since the job postings data are available starting only in 2007,
we cannot observe whether changes in stated skill requirements were simply a continuation
of a previous trend. To address both these issues, we analyze changes in the skill level of
employed workers using Census and ACS data that are available for a wider range of years
(2000 and 20052014).37
Figure 3 summarizes results for four dependent variables and a similar speciﬁcation to
equation (1).38 The ﬁrst three panels measure changes in relative employment rates across
education groups. For example, the top left panel measures the change in the ratio of
high-school-graduate to high-school-dropout employment rates. This relative employment
rate averages 1.6 across our whole sample period. We ﬁnd that in a hard-hit state (90th-
percentile shock), the high-school-graduatedropout relative employment rate increases by
37In these years, 66% of MSAs (roughly 85% of the population) can be identiﬁed.
38We naturally do not include the ACS controls in these regressions since they are highly collinear with
the employment variables on the left hand side in contemporaneous years. Also, we include a time trend,
rather than year ﬁxed eﬀects, because we have a smaller set of MSAs to separately identify the national
trends. Results with year ﬁxed eﬀects are similar but noisier.
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510 percentage points after 2007, relative to a less hard-hit state (10th-percentile shock).
We ﬁnd similar eﬀects for the change in relative employment of workers with some college
compared to dropouts (top right), and the change for workers with at least a bachelor's
degree relative to dropouts (bottom left).
In the bottom right panel, we examine the change in the average experience level of
employed workers. Experience is simply years of school minus age minus six, which is diﬀerent
in spirit from the stated requirement in the BG data that an applicant needs experience in
the ﬁeld. However, more-experienced workers are still more skilled than less-experienced
workers, and the measure is as close as the data allow. We ﬁnd that in hard-hit states,
average experience is about a ﬁfth of a year higher than it was in 2007, relative to less
hard-hit states.39
Finally, we note that data from 2000, 2005, and 2006 show that the skill composition
of employed workers was similar across MSAs and unrelated to how severely the Great
Recession would aﬀect areas. This pattern is reassuring that there are also no pretrends in
stated skill requirements.
We thus present strong evidence that employers in harder-hit MSAs were induced to
increase both stated preferences for a range of skills that are complementary to RBTC and
employment of skilled, relative to unskilled workers. Futhermore, while most measures of
local labor-market strength had converged back to pre-recession levels by 2015, diﬀerences
in stated and realized skill demands remained. MSAs that experienced severe shocks in the
Great Recession still look diﬀerent from how they appeared in 2007, and diﬀerent from other
cities that experienced weaker shocks.
4.2 Heterogeneity within and across Occupations
Why do skill requirements change diﬀerentially across MSAs? It is possible that these
diﬀerences result from selection: perhaps in harder-hit MSAs only higher-skilled jobs survive
in the early recovery. An episodic RBTC-based explanation involving changes in production
technology, however, would imply upskilling within occupations, even as demand also shifts
across occupations, from routine to abstract. For example, community and social service
specialists at a food bank in Washington, D.C. might be required not only to interact with
clients to assist with food security, but may have to understand and use database software
and GIS, as well, to better serve them (McCoy 2016). Simultaneously, in order to better
reach and understand online readers venerable journalistic organizations such as the New
York Times now hire scientists, not reporters, to be chief data oﬃcers (Greenﬁeld 2014).
To investigate whether MSA-level changes in skill requirements are prevalent within
and/or across occupations, we generate counterfactual skill distributions and estimate re-
39This result is consistent with Forsythe (2016), who ﬁnds that the hire rate of young workers falls, relative
to that of older workers, in recessions. She provides evidence based on wage data that these changes in hiring
are driven by labor demand, rather than by labor supply.
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Figure 4: Within and Across Occupation Changes in Skill Requirements
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Graphs plot impact of MSA shock on only change in each element, holding constant
the other element at its 2007 level. Regressions also control for year fixed effects and MSA characteristics.
gressions like equation (1), using as the dependent variable the change in a counterfactual
skill distribution from the actual 2007 MSA-level skill requirement. We plot the coeﬃcients
on shockm ∗ I t in ﬁgure 4. The solid blue line presents results where we hold constant the
occupation distribution of ads within an MSA in 2007 and allow only the within occupation-
MSA skill requirement to change. The dashed red line, in contrast, holds constant the within
occupation-MSA skill requirement at its 2007 level and allows the occupation distribution
of ads within the MSA to vary with time.40
As can be seen, the entirety of the eﬀect is concentrated on the within-occupation mar-
gin, with no role for the shifting distribution of ads across occupations. Skill requirements
increase in hard-hit MSAs because for the same 4-digit occupations, ads are more likely to
list education, experience, cognitive, and computer requirements.
We also examine the robustness of the within-occupation changes in skill requirements
to a range of speciﬁcations, based on equation (2), which has 4-digit-occupation-MSA-year
cells as the unit of observation.
(2) skillomt − skillom07 = α0 + [shockm ∗ I t]α1 + I t +Xmβ + εomt.
40Virtually all ads posted in the 20102015 period are in occupation-MSAs that also posted in 2007, so
we can generate change variables. The 0.36% of ads that cannot be matched back are dropped from these
analyses. Our formal decomposition in section 5.1 addresses this concern. We also address the fact that order
in the decomposition matters (for example, we could have instead benchmarked the non-changing variable
at its time t level, rather than at 2007).
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The results are reported in appendix tables D1a and D1b. Column 4 summarizes the base-
line speciﬁcation, while column 5 adds occupation ﬁxed eﬀects and occupation-speciﬁc time
trends.41 These controls allow occupations to systematically diﬀer in their change in skill re-
quirements from 2007, as well as in the slope of the change, across all MSAs. These could be
important if some occupations are both more likely to upskill or accelerate upskilling because
of preexisting trends and are disproportionately located in hard-hit MSAs. The controls also
help adjust for changes in the sample driven, say, by changes in the representativeness of
occupations in the BG data. However, we obtain very similar results even when including
the occupation-speciﬁc controls.
Finally, our data aﬀord the unique opportunity to measure changes in skill requirements
within occupations, while the bulk of work on polarization has measured shifts in employment
and wages only across occupations. That literature has successfully pinpointed the kinds of
occupations that can be replaced by machines or overseas labor using information on the
tasks performed by workers at the occupation level.42 These occupations tend to be in the
middle of the skill distribution, since those jobs tend to be the more routine. Autor (2014)
and Jaimovich and Siu (2015) point out that employment shifted away from middle-skill
occupations in the Great Recession. Though not shown, we also ﬁnd this to be true of
vacancy postings. We instead focus on our ability to measure task and skill content of jobs
in the BG data to ask whether RBTC also occurs within middle-skill occupations.
To explore heterogeneity in within-occupation changes in skill requirements induced by
the Great Recession, we estimate equation (2) separately for 20 occupation skill groups. As
is common in the literature (Autor 2015), we deﬁne occupation skill by wage percentiles
from a ﬁxed point in time. In our case, we use the 2000 Census to divide occupations into
ventiles, based on their average weekly wage of full-time workers.43
41BG generates occupation codes using an imputation that is based on the job title and other characteristics
of the ad. One might be worried about the accuracy of this imputation and, though the algorithm was
constant over our sample period, the amount of measurement error induced by the ﬁxed algorithm could
vary over time. Reassuringly, the baseline results are nearly identical to the MSA-level results presented in
ﬁgure 1.
42The original work by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) and Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006) used
the US Department of Labor's Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT; US Department of Labor 1977) to
categorize occupations into manual, routine, and cognitive. They chose this categorization, arguing that
new technologies can successfully replace American workers performing routine, algorithmic tasks, and are
complementary to both manual and cognitive and analytical functions. Indeed, though coarse, this grouping
successfully predicted employment changes in the 1990s and has been used in a number of subsequent papers,
including Autor and Dorn (2013).
43We obtain weekly wages (annual wage and salary income divided by weeks worked in the last year) of
full-time, full-year workers (worked at least 48 hours in the last week and usually work at least 35 hours
per week) from the 2000 Census and deﬁne ventiles based on Census sample weights. We do not follow the
traditional approach of using the 1980 wage distribution both because we are interested in a more modern
characterization of skills and because long-term institutional and structural changes in the labor market (e.g.,
the declining share of unions and the growth of information technology) have made the earnings distribution
in 1980 a poorer proxy for skill 30 years later. However, we do obtain qualitatively similar results if we use
the 1980 wage skill distribution, or if we classify occupations based on a measure of critical-thinking and
problem-solving intensity derived from O*Net and developed by Joseph Altonji.
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Figure 5: Upskilling by 2000 Skill Group
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In ﬁgure 5, we plot the coeﬃcients on shockm ∗ I2010 (solid blue line) and shockm ∗
I2015 (dashed red line), respectively, smoothed with local linear regression. These summary
measures thus depict the size of the initial upskilling eﬀect and the size of the remaining
eﬀect at the end of the sample period. In most cases the two sets of coeﬃcients are are
quite close to each other, implying that the majority of the upskilling eﬀects are persistent
within occupation categories. Almost all coeﬃcients are statistically diﬀerent from zero
(except for the lowest-wage occupations in the cognitive and computer speciﬁcations) and
economically meaningful. We also see a fairly similar pattern across dependent variables:
upskilling at relatively higher rates at low and high modes of the skill distribution, though
in most cases (education, experience, computer), the low mode shows less persistence than
the higher one. Together, these results suggest upskilling is broad-based across occupations,
although the eﬀects are particularly pronounced and persistent in the upper-middle of the
skill distribution.44
Beaudry, Green, and Sand (2014, 2016) document that more-educated workers have in-
creased their employment in lower-skilled jobs since 2000. They term this shift, along with
44Although minimum wage increases during the Great Recession have been shown to have sizable, negative
employment eﬀects for the low-skilled (Clemens and Wither 2014, Clemens 2015), our results are unlikely to
be driven by a binding minimum wage that causes ﬁrms to seek more-skilled workers as a means of lowering
the eﬀective skill price in a downturn. Occupations higher in the skill distribution, where we show upskilling
eﬀects to be strongest, are unlikely to face binding minimum wages. More general downward wage rigidities
(see Shimer 2004 and Hall 2005) may yield a similar eﬀect; however, wages of new job matches have been
shown to be much more cyclical, once selection is taken into account (Martins, Solon, and Thomas 2012).
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stagnating employment in cognitive occupations, the great reversal in the demand for cog-
nitive skill.45 They hypothesize that lessened demand for cognitive occupations induces
college graduates to take jobs lower in the skill distribution, squeezing out less-educated
workers who formerly held these jobs. In light of the evidence above, we propose that any
declining demand in cognitive occupations was accompanied by an increased demand for
cognitive skill within routine-task occupations, and this shift accelerated in the Great Reces-
sion. Even as employment has shifted from routine to cognitive occupations, the remaining
routine occupations themselves are becoming less routine and more cognitive. Our work
thus highlights an alternative hypothesis for why high-skilled workers are increasingly found
in lower-skilled occupations: these latter occupations are becoming more skilled, and it is
possible that less-skilled workers are displaced because they are unable to perform the new
duties required.
4.3 Upskilling and Traded Products
We exploit cross-sectional variation in how MSAs bore the Great Recession to understand
the broader impact of recessions on skill demand. However, the models from the literature
discussed abovewhich predict productivity-enhancing improvements will be concentrated
in recessionsgenerate an additional prediction when using local shocks: upskilling eﬀects
should be more pronounced in sectors producing locally-consumed goods and services. Unlike
the tradeable sector, the product demand for which is largely determined by markets farther
away or diﬀused across many areas, ﬁrms producing locally-consumed goods and services
are highly sensitive to local demand shocks, and thus should be more greatly aﬀected by the
variation we identify with the Bartik employment measure. To the extent that upskilling is
driven by shifts from dying, low-productivity ﬁrms to new ﬁrms with modern production, or
because surviving ﬁrms choose to adjust when the opportunity cost of temporarily stopping
production is low or when layoﬀs are already necessary, the phenomenon should be more
pronounced in our analytic strategy among ﬁrms selling products at the local level.
To classify sectors, we adopt two well-known measures of the degree to which production
is oﬀshorable. The ﬁrst, from Blinder and Krueger (2013), is based primarily on workers'
survey responses to questions of location requirements to do their jobs. We create an index
equal to the average of Blinder and Krueger's three preferred measures, which are available
at the two-digit NAICS level.46 The second, from Jensen and Kleitzer (2005), is based on
geographic concentration of employment in the industry. Intuitively, if employment for a
sector can be geographically concentrated (e.g., software developers in Silicon Valley) then
45See also Castex and Dechter (2014) and Deming (2015).
46Blinder and Krueger's (2013) three preferred measures are based on (1) self-classiﬁcation: whether
the respondents believe their duties can be performed remotely or must be done on-site; (2) inferred:
determined from questions about location requirements of the job; and (3) externally coded: how expert
coders categorize jobs based on typical survey questions on industry and occupation.
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output for that sector is more likely traded and need not be consumed locally. From Jensen
and Kleitzer, we obtain the share of employment (in the two-digit NAICS sector) that can
be categorized as least geographically concentrated.47
In equation 3, we estimate the change in skill requirements within (two-digit NAICS)
sector , s, as a function of the Bartik shock, and we allow this eﬀect to vary with the
degree to which the sector produces locally consumed products (locals). We augment our
base controls with sector ﬁxed eﬀects, to control for the main eﬀect of local and other
unobservables that would generate variation in skill demand growth across sectors.
(3) skillsmt−skillsm07 = α0+[shockm∗I t]α1+[locals∗shockm∗I t]α2+I t+Isector+Xmβ+εomt.
Figure 6 uses the Blinder-Krueger composite oﬀshorability measure and ﬁts impacts for
non-traded (10th percentile) and traded (90th percentile) sectors with solid blue and dashed
maroon lines, respectively. We ﬁnd that increases in skill requirements are larger in the
non-traded sectors. This is true for experience, cognitive skills and computer skills, where
the diﬀerentials are statistically signiﬁcant and eﬀects for the traded sectors are essentially
zero. In contrast, for education, both traded and non-traded sectors see signiﬁcant increases
in skill requirements, and the diﬀerences between them are small.
For comparison, appendix ﬁgure D2 shows results using the Jensen-Kleitzer geographic
concentration measure. We ﬁnd that the least concentrated sectors (and therefore likely
the least oﬀshorable) see substantially larger upskilling. This again holds for experience,
cognitive skill, and computer skill, with magnitudes similar to the Blinder-Krueger measure,
even though the measures are based on diﬀerent methodologies.
These results help conﬁrm the hypothesized mechanism for upskilling. Other expla-
nations, such as temporary opportunistic upskilling, do not predict speciﬁc heterogeneous
impacts across sectors, and are motivated by the availability of (homogeneous) skilled labor.
The fact that we see little to no diﬀerential eﬀect for education requirements across sectors
suggests that upskilling may reﬂect multiple factors . However, the bulk of the evidence sup-
ports the hypothesisthat upskilling eﬀects are concentrated in the least-traded sectorsthe
ones most sensitive to local consumer demand.
These within-sector estimates also help address a concern about the Bartik shock, which
uses for identiﬁcation national changes in employment growth by three-digit NAICS industry
and MSA-level industry composition. Suppose that the industries driving negative employ-
ment shocks are precisely those that experience contemporaneous technology shocksand
that concomitant temporary employment declines during an adjustment period. In this case
our results would not indicate that ﬁrms concentrated their adoption of existing technologies
47Jensen and Kleitzer (2005) measure geographic dispersion across MSAs of employment in detailed in-
dustry categories, and designate the category least concentrated as those industries with a Gini coeﬃcient
less than 0.1.
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Figure 6: Upskilling by Sector Tradability, based on Blinder-Krueger Oﬀshorability
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Bartik shock*year effects interacted with offshorability, fitted for 90th and 10th percentiles.
Regressions also control for sector and year fixed effects and MSA characteristics.
in recessions but rather that the occurrence of the innovations themselves was concentrated
in the recession. The fact that our results obtain even within sector alleviates this concern.
Holding constant the national change in skill requirements for a sector (and therefore also
any coincident innovation in the sector), we still ﬁnd evidence of upskilling.48 That is, for
a given sector, when a ﬁrm is located in a harder-hit MSA, it increases skill requirements,
while a ﬁrm producing in the same sector but in a less hard-hit MSA does not. Our hy-
pothesized mechansim is that the aggregate consumer demand shock generated by the Bartik
instrument reduces adjustment costs and enables ﬁrms to adopt existing technologies and/or
increases the exit of low-productivity ﬁrms.
5 Heterogeneity across Firms
The evidence presented thus far shows a persistent shift in job requirements toward workers
with greater education, experience, and cognitive and computer skills in MSAs more severely
aﬀected by the Great Recession. This pattern is consistent with recessions accelerating
adoption of routine-biased technologies. This accelerated technological adoption could be
48In the estimates underlying ﬁgure 6 and appendix ﬁgure D2, we still ﬁnd that the sector with average
oﬀshorability experiences statistically signiﬁcant upskilling. Our results hold at the more disaggregated
three-digit NAICS level, the same level underlying the Bartik shock. Furthermore, we have also explored
using variation in housing price shocks to generate variation in local demand and obtained qualitatively
similar results.
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driven by substitution from failing low-productivity ﬁrms to new high-productivity ﬁrms, as a
cleansing model of recessions would predict (Schumpeter 1939). In addition, surviving ﬁrms
may concentrate the timing of new technological adoption around recessions because of lower
adjustment costs. Many classes of models in macroeconomics generate these consequences,
although sparse direct evidence exists in support of these models.
In this section, we decompose the upskilling eﬀect into changes within and across ﬁrms
and occupations to better understand which mechanisms are at play. We ﬁnd that both
between- and within-ﬁrm adjustments are important drivers of upskilling. We then focus
speciﬁcally on within-ﬁrm changes in skill requirements, a unique capability of our data,
in order to test additional predictions that support the hypothesis that upskilling is driven
primarily by accelerated adoption of new technologies. In our argument, once a ﬁrm up-
grades its workforce, presumably with a concomitant upgrade in machines and technology or
overseas infrastructure, the changes should remain. That is, if ﬁrms are changing what they
do, not simply whom they hire, those changes will endure. We thus investigate ﬁrm-level
changes in skill requirements and other factors of production, notably use of capital, and ﬁnd
that the same ﬁrms that increased their advertised skill requirements also increased their
capital stocks the most, another pattern consistent with restructuring of production.
5.1 Decomposing Upskilling Within and Across Firms
We here explore the extent to which upskilling is driven by shifts in postings from old to
new ﬁrms and changes within existing ﬁrms. By employing a formal decomposition, we
investigate these margins simultaneously with shifts in ads across ﬁrms and those across
occupations.49
Deﬁne Ct as the set of ﬁrm-MSAs that post ads in both year t and in 2007. We hereafter
refer to these as continuing ﬁrms, and the set of ﬁrm-MSAs that have posts only in 2007
or only in t as non-continuing ﬁrms. In our sample, 54% of weighted observations are to
continuing ﬁrms.50 We hope to understand the extent to which substitution across dying
and newly born ﬁrms aﬀects overall changes in skill requirements, though it is important to
note that we cannot distinguish whether a ﬁrm does not post in a given period because it
has no vacancies (e.g., a hiring freeze) or because it does not exist.
In equation (4), we express the average skill requirement in MSA m and year t as a
function of: pCmt, the share of ads in an MSA-year posted in continuing ﬁrms;
51
NCfmt
NCmt
, the
49Kahn and McEntarfer (2015) show that workers matching to jobs in downturns are more likely to match
to low-paying ﬁrms than high-paying ﬁrms.
50Here we deﬁne ﬁrm as the group of ads with the same employer name in the same MSA, which allows
us to take advantage of the cross-sectional variation in how MSAs bore the Great Recession. The set Ct is
deﬁned separately for each year from 20102015, though naturally there is substantial overlap in the set of
continuing ﬁrms across years.
51By deﬁnition, pCmt ≡ N
C
mt
NCmt+N
NC
mt
.
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distribution of ads across continuing ﬁrms in mt ;
NCofmt
NCfmt
, the distribution of ads across occu-
pations for a given continuing ﬁrm; skillCofmt , the average skill requirement for continuing
ﬁrm f , posting in occupation o, MSA m, and year t;
NNComt
NNCmt
, the distribution of ads across
occupations among non-continuing ﬁrms;52 and ¯skillNComt, the average skill requirement for
occupation o, among all non-continuing ﬁrms in mt (that is, the average skill requirement
in the occupation-MSA-year among ﬁrm-MSAs that posted either only in 2007 or only in
period t).
(4) skillmt = p
C
mt
∑
fm∈Ct
∑
o
NCfmt
NCmt
NCofmt
NCfmt
∗ skillCofmt + (1− pCmt)
¯∑
o
NNComt
NNCmt
∗ skillNComt.
We then decompose the eﬀect of the Bartik employment shock on the overall change
in skill requirements at the MSA-year level (skillmt − skillm07), into eﬀects attributable
tochanges in these components. We provide the full details of this decomposition in appendix
B, and here simply summarize key results.
In ﬁgure 7, we report the fraction of the overall impact of shock in the given year at-
tributed to each component.53 To make the graph easier to read, we combine some compo-
nents together, focusing on the (empirically) most important.
The lightest bar shows the fraction of the overall upskilling eﬀect in each year attributable
to changes in the distribution of ﬁrms, combining the share of ads to continuing ﬁrms pCmt
with the ﬁrm distribution among continuing ﬁrms
NCfmt
NCmt
.54 The next lightest bar shows the
fraction attributable to changes in the occupation distribution, combining the occupation
distribution among continuing (
NCofmt
NCfmt
) and non-continuing (
NNComt
NNCmt
) ﬁrms. Across all dependent
variables, we ﬁnd that changes in these ﬁrm and occupation distributions account for very
little of the upskilling eﬀects.
Instead, the vast majority of the upskilling eﬀect is split across the two darker bars.
The darkest bar shows the fraction attributable to changes in skill requirements of non-
continuing ﬁrms for a given occupation ( ¯skillNComt). It compares, for each occupation, the skill
requirements for ﬁrms that posted only in the later period (20102015) to the requirements
for ﬁrms that stopped posting after 2007. The adjacent, next-darkest bars show the fraction
attributable to the change in skill requirements between 2007 and t among continuing ﬁrm-
MSAs.55 Across dependent variables and years, each of these two components contributes
52Since, by deﬁnition, non-continuing ﬁrms cannot be matched across time periods, we aggregate over all
non-continuing ﬁrms.
53Naturally, the order in which we perform the decomposition will matter for the relative importance of
the components. Here each fraction represents the average contribution across all possible decomposition
orders. More details are provided in the appendix.
54Appendix table B1 separates these two eﬀects, shown in columns 1 and 2. We ﬁnd that the share of ads
to continuing ﬁrms is the more important component, especially in the later years.
55This component includes both the change in skill requirements within ﬁrm-occupation-MSAs for ﬁrms
that posted in a given occupation in both periods, and changes in skill requirements driven by continuing
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Figure 7: Decomposing Upskilling Into Within and Across Firm Components
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We decompose the impact of the MSA-specific Bartik employment shock on the change in skill requirements from 2007 in each year.
We then plot the share attributed to each components, averaged across all possible decomposition orders.
to roughly half of the upskilling eﬀect. These results are thus consistent with both the ﬁrm
birth-death substitution eﬀect à la Schumpeter and the importance of within-ﬁrm episodic
restructuring.
5.2 Within-Firm Changes
The decomposition shows that roughly half of the upskilling eﬀect in each year can be
accounted for by within-continuing-ﬁrm changes in skill requirements. This dimension merits
further exploration since, while many of the models that generate episodic restructuring
consider ﬁrm-level responses to the changing costs and beneﬁts of adopting new technologies,
there is essentially no direct evidence on the matter. In addition to the prediction that
skill requirements should increase within ﬁrms (as shown above), these models generate
two additional implications that we can test in our data: (1) increases in a ﬁrm's skill
requirements should endure, and (2) upskilling should be accompanied by increases in capital
stock.
We divide ﬁrms into (posting-weighted) quartiles based on changes in skill requirements
between 2007 and 2010; we then plot the average skill requirements for each quartile over
ﬁrm-MSAs that post for diﬀerent occupations. The summary measure plotted in ﬁgure 7 sums these two
eﬀects, but they are shown separately in appendix table B1, columns 3 and 5. Empirically, we ﬁnd that both
are important; the former is more important for education and experience requirements, while the two are
roughly equally important for cognitive and computer requirements.
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Figure 8: Skill Requirements by Firm 2007-2010 Change
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Graph plots average skill requirement by year and quartile of 2007-10 firm-level skill change.
time in ﬁgure 8.56 Firms began at fairly similar average skill levels in 2007, although this sim-
ilarity is not imposed by our exercise. By construction there is a sharp contrast across ﬁrm
quartiles in 2010, with the darker shaded lines representing ﬁrms with larger skill increases.
Interestingly, and not by construction, these quartiles remain spread apart throughout the
remainder of the sample period, and by 2015, ﬁrms in the higher quartiles still had substan-
tially higher skill requirements in their new ads than ﬁrms in the lower quartiles.
This within-ﬁrm persistence in upskilling holds up in regression analysis and is sub-
stantial. Though not shown, we ﬁnd that, on average, 6070% of a ﬁrm's increase in skill
requirements between 2007 and 2010 persists through 2015. Estimates are even larger when
we instrument for the initial increase in upskilling with the Bartik shock. It could have been
the case that the majority of ﬁrms increased skill requirements during the recession and
reverted back later in the recovery (for example, in an attempt to opportunistically recruit
while markets were slack), with higher skill demand in later years unrelated to the recession.
Instead we ﬁnd that upskilling late in the recovery is driven by the same ﬁrms that initially
upskilled during the Great Recession. These results thus provide further support for models
of episodic restructuring.
An RBTC explanation would also suggest that ﬁrms automate routine tasks with ma-
56We exploit the subsample of ﬁrms in our data that post at least ﬁve observations in each of 2007 and
2010, comprising 66% of weighted observations. Column 2 of appendix table D2 shows that the probability
of satisfying this restriction does not vary with the local labor market shock. Quartiles are deﬁned separately
for each skill measure, weighting by the ﬁrm average number of posts across 2007-2010.
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chines (or cheaper, outsourced labor), which complement skilled labor. If mechanization is
occurring, then ﬁrms should also invest in physical capital around the time that they up-
skill.57 We investigate directly whether the ﬁrms that upskilled simultaneously increased
investment. We do so by linking the publicly traded ﬁrms in our data to Compustat North
America by Standard & Poors (hereafter Compustat), the most complete database of U.S.
ﬁrm accounting and balance sheet data.58 While we cannot identify IT investment speciﬁ-
cally in the Compustat data, we can measure a ﬁrm's overall holdings of property, plant, and
equipment (PPENT). This measure of capital stock includes IT investments and, under the
RBTC hypothesis, should increase faster for ﬁrms mechanizing or using more sophisticated
production technology.
We match ﬁrms to Compustat using ﬁrm name and provide details of the matching
procedure in Appendix A.4.59 Figure 9 provides a general sense of the relationship between
upskilling and investment. We present binned scatter plots of the change in skill requirements
between 2007 and 2010 on the rate of change in capital stock (PPENT) over the same time
period.60 There is a strong and highly signiﬁcant positive relationship for all the skills
measures. Firms that had larger increases in skill requirements between 2007 and 2010 also
had larger increases in capital stock over the same time period.61
We also provide results from regression analysis, analogous to those presented in ﬁgure
1, comparing the impact of the Bartik shock across ﬁrms with diﬀerent capital investment
behavior. We estimate regressions similar to that in equation (1) but control for the ﬁrm's
change in capital stock between 2007 and 2010, and allow this variable to interact with the
shock-year eﬀects.62 Figure 10 ﬁts the diﬀerential impact (and 90% conﬁdence interval) of
the Bartik shock for ﬁrms at the 90th and 10th percentiles of capital change. The former
had a 60% increase in their capital stock while the latter experienced a 20% drop.
We ﬁnd that ﬁrms with larger increases in capital stock had greater upskilling, and these
diﬀerences persist. In harder-hit MSAs, skill requirements increase roughly 30% (education
57This may seem at odds with the stylized facts on the cyclicality of investment. However, Jaimovich
and Siu (2012), show that investment in information processing equipment and software bounced back
immediately following the end of the NBER-dated recession (December 2007 through June 2009), while
domestic private investment was much more sluggish. IT and computers are exactly the technologies that
drive RBTC (Michaels, Natraj, and Van Reenan 2014).
58We obtain these data via Wharton Research Data Services.
59We can link 46% of weighted observations from the 20072010 change sample used in ﬁgure 8 to a
business in Compustat. In column 3 of appendix table D2, we show that the change in the share of ﬁrms
matching to Compustat does not vary with the Bartik shock.
60We aggregate the ﬁrms into percentiles based on the magnitude of changes in skill requirements (weighted
by the average number of ads posted in 2007 and 2010); we then plot for each percentile bin the ad-weighted
average of this variable against the ad-weighted average of the change in capital stock.
61The ﬁgure would look similar if instead of actual ﬁrm upskilling we used predicted ﬁrm-speciﬁc upskilling
measures based on variation in the Bartik shock.
62Regressions are estimated at the ﬁrm-MSA-year level for the Compustat matched sample. Capital change
varies at the ﬁrm level but we disaggregate to ﬁrm-MSA to take advantage of variation in local labor market
conditions. These can be thought of as estimating the relationship between upskilling and capital change as
a function of the Bartik shock in locations where the ﬁrm tends to post.
30
Figure 9: Firm-Level Changes in Skill Requirements and Capital Stock 20072010
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Binned scatter of firm-level rate of change in capital stock and change in skill requirement from 2007 to
2010 for Compustat-matched sample. Scatter (but not lines) omits 2 outliers with > 2 captial stock change.
Figure 10: Diﬀerential Upskilling by 90-10 Change in Firm Capital Stock
0
.
00
5
.
01
.
01
5
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Education Requirement
0
.
00
5
.
01
.
01
5
.
02
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Experience Requirement
0
.
00
2
.
00
4
.
00
6
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Cognitive Skill Requirement
0
.
00
4
.
00
8
.
01
2
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Computer Skill Requirement
Co
ef
fic
ie
nt
Year
Graphs plots the coefficients on the Bartik shock*year interacted with the firm-level capital change,
fitted to the 90-10 capital change differential, and 90% CI's (dashed lines).
Regressions also control for year fixed effects and MSA characteristics.
31
and experience requirements) to about 50% (cognitive and computer requirements) more
in high-investment ﬁrms than in low-investment ﬁrms. These diﬀerences are all signiﬁcant,
typically at the 1% level. Thus, throughout our sample period, ﬁrms with larger increases
in capital stock around the time of the Great Recession also had larger increases in their
posted skill requirements.
6 Discussion
Thus far, we have shown that job postings in harder-hit MSAs experienced larger increases
in their education, experience, cognitive, and computer requirements following the Great
Recession. Furthermore, these requirements remained elevated through the end of our sample
in 2015, even as most measures of labor market conditions had converged back to their
pre-recession levels. These increased skill requirements are robust to controls for the local
supply of skill availability and occur broadly withinand not just acrossa wide range of
occupations, and are concentrated in sectors that are more susceptible to local demand shocks
and ﬁrms that also increased their capital stock. Furthermore, as best as we can measure,
the changes in stated skill preferences translate to actual changes in realized employment.
We believe the most likely explanation for these facts is that the recession accelerated
adoption of existing technologies. Demand for skill changed because the means of production
changed, and this process was episodic, catalyzed by the Great Recession. Theoretical mod-
els that can generate this kind of lumpy adjustment posit several possible mechanisms:
substitution across old and new ﬁrms (Schumpeter 1939, Caballero and Hammour 1994,
1996), or greater eﬃciency to within-ﬁrm adjustments when the opportunity cost of adjust-
ing is lower (Hall 2005), when managerial attention is more focused on eﬃciency (Koender
and Rogerson 2005), or when layoﬀs are necessary, anyway (Mortensen and Pissarides 1994,
Berger 2012). Using speciﬁc empirical skill measures that reﬂect what the discipline has
learned about technological change over the past 20 years (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003;
Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2011), we ﬁnd evidence consistent with these mechanisms: about
half of the upskilling eﬀect is driven by substitution across old and new ﬁrms and half is due
to within-ﬁrm changes. Within continuing ﬁrms, changes in skill requirements are persis-
tent and accompanied by changes in capital stock, consistent with increased mechanization.
Finally, upskilling is more pronounced in sectors more sensitive to local consumer demand,
those for which restructuring costs are likely to be lower in downturns.
While ﬁrms may respond to changes in labor market conditions through posted skill
requirements for a variety of other reasons, these cannot rationalize our full body of ﬁndings.
For example, ﬁrms may worry that a ﬂood of applicants early in the recovery will create
a bottleneck in screening, and therefore try to signal that certain (unwanted) applicants
need not apply. However, this would not explain the accompanying changes in employment
that we ﬁnd, nor would it generate persistent increases in skill requirements independent of
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the available supply of labor (as proxied by the unemployment rate).
It could instead be the case that ﬁrms that cannot attract (or aﬀord) more-skilled workers
in a tight labor market opportunistically seek them out in a slack one.63 This mechanism
would again predict short-lived upskilling eﬀects that would be driven by the local availability
of skilled labor. We do see some evidence consistent with opportunistic upskilling, though
it cannot be the primary driver of our results. As we noted, controls for unemployment
rates in our regressions do aﬀect estimated coeﬃcients on the Bartik shock early in the
recovery (when unemployment is high) but have no eﬀect on estimated coeﬃcients in later
years (when unemployment has recovered but skill requirements have not). Commensurately,
holding constant the overall size of the Bartik shock on an MSA, a larger increase in the
college graduate unemployment rate between 2007 and 2010 generates greater increases in
skill requirements early in the recovery, but these eﬀects dissipate.64 Furthermore, there is
no reason to think that opportunistic upskilling should be concentrated in the non-tradeable
sector or accompanied by increases in capital stock.
Indeed, the concentration and persistence of the elevated skill demand provides substan-
tial evidence in favor of our hypothesis, since most alternative explanations predict conver-
gence when the economy recovers. While it is possible that labor markets are slower to
recover than unemployment rates and employment levels suggest, it is telling that we ﬁnd
little overall convergence in skill requirements as markets improve, even though the data do
indicate convergence in some occupations (primarily on the low end of the skill distribution;
see ﬁgure 5).
In our view, the only remaining alternative hypothesis is that changes in labor supply
later in the recovery induce changes in skill demand. For example, availability of skilled labor
might increase later in the recovery due to diﬀerential quit behavior or changes in educational
attainment brought on by the Great Recession. In either case changes in the availability of
skilled labor would be correlated with the Bartik shock, but might be uncorrelated with
unemployment rates.
First, we point out that this kind of explanation is hard to reconcile with the result
that upskilling later in the recovery is driven by the same ﬁrms that upskilled early in the
recovery (ﬁgure 8). If early upskilling is driven by bottlenecks and overall unemployment,
while later upskilling is driven by quits and a more-educated workforce, then there is no
particular reason why the two should be linked. Second, we have directly examined the
timing of quits and educational attainment as a function of the Bartik shock. We conclude
that these eﬀects cannot be important drivers of our result. See appendix C for details.
Simply put, the evidence supports that changes in skill requirements reﬂect changes in
63Even though it is well known that recessions disproportionately aﬀect low-skilled workers (Hoynes, Miller,
and Schaller 2012), making high-skilled workers relatively more costly and less available, it is still possible
that high-skilled workers suﬃciently reduce their reservation wage to become worthwhile hires to ﬁrms that
generally employ the less skilled.
64See appendix C.
33
production, not simply changes in whom ﬁrms ask for.
7 Conclusion
During the recovery following the Great Recession, anecdotal evidence suggested that the
composition of new hires shifted toward higher-skilled workers, resulting in many workers
being overeducated for their jobs (Burning Glass Technologies 2014). However, it was not
clear how broad, deep, or enduring these eﬀects were, or the extent to which they were
driven by labor supply or labor demand responses. In particular, ﬁrms may have treated the
recession as a time of cleansing, enabling them to restructure their production in a manner
consistent with routine-biased technological change. In this paper we draw upon detailed job
postings data to provide comprehensive, broad-based evidence of upskillingﬁrms demand-
ing higher-skilled workerswhen the local economy suﬀers a recession. We present a range
of evidence that consistently supports our hypothesis that this eﬀect is primarily driven by
an episodic restructuring on the part of ﬁrms and thus is likely to be long-lasting.
This paper thus provides the ﬁrst direct evidence that the Great Recession accelerated
routine-biased technological change, and in so doing touches on a number of literatures and
policy questions. It is consistent with the important, but suggestive, evidence provided by
Jaimovich and Siu (2015) that the vast majority of employment lost in routine occupations
was lost during recessions and never recovered. It also contributes to the many models in
macroeconomics that assume adjustment costs and imply that recessions will be times of
cleansing in terms of production (Schumpeter 1939, Koenders and Rogerson 2005, Berger
2012). As hypothesized by many, these kinds of episodic, productivity-enhancing changes
can result in jobless recovery. Our ﬁndings are thus extremely relevant for policy makers,
who allocate billions of taxpayer dollars to subsidize workers' job searches in a downturn.
We also demonstrate how electronic job postings data can provide a unique opportunity
to understand real-time changes in skill demand both across and within occupations. This
level of detail can provide new insight relative to earlier literature. We are able to show
that occupations themselves are changing. Many occupations were likely already drawing
in higher-skilled workers before the Great Recession, and as we show, this eﬀect accelerated
during the recession and subsequent recovery. This can help to clarify studies by Beaudry,
Green, and Sand (2014, 2016) and others documenting the great reversal in demand for
cognitive skill. While it is certainly the case that employment in high-skill occupations has
not grown, on average, over the past decade, our results show that cognitive workers still
retain a substantial advantage over the low-skilled. They are drawn into formerly middle-
skill jobs, which are becoming higher-skilled. We can thus explain why skilled workers still
earn a premium in the labor market even though the returns to cognitive occupations appear
to have diminished.
The U.S. economy has seen remarkable changes over the past 30 years, brought on by
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the computer revolution and globalization. These changes have led to great increases in
productivity and wealth, but the beneﬁts have not been shared across all workers. Indeed,
mounting evidence suggests that a large population of workers, formerly employed in routine-
task jobs, have suﬀered permanent labor market, health, and social consequences from the
structural changes in the economy (Autor et al. 2014; Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2015;
Foote and Ryan 2015; Pierce and Schott 2015). Our results highlight that a worker's ability
to adjust to these changes may be especially diﬃcult because the changes are episodic,
concentrated in recessions. Thus large numbers of workers can ﬁnd their skills depreciated
at the same time. This is perhaps evident in the stair-step declines in male labor force
participation that have tended to be concentrated around recessions (Moﬃtt 2012, Foote
and Ryan 2015). If the changes to production instead occurred more gradually, workers
would still need to be retrained, but over a longer time period, and on a much smaller scale
at any given time. Future policy work should be directed at understanding how to reallocate
workers on a large scale following a recession.
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A Data Appendix
It is estimated that as of 2014 between 60% and 70% of all job postings could be found online
(Carnevale, Jayasundera, and Repnikov 2014). Indeed, The Conference Board discontinued
its-long-running, print-based Help-Wanted Advertising Index in 2008, after having begun a
Help-Wanted Online Index in 2005 (HWOL).65 Several other private-sector ﬁrms also began
to track online job postings in the 2000s by using web-crawling and data-scraping methods.
In this study, we employ data from one such ﬁrm, Burning Glass Technologies. This appendix
discusses the representativeness of the data and investigates whether representativeness has
changed over the time period of analysis.
A.1 Occupation-Industry Composition in BG
The BG database covers only vacancies posted on the Internet, as opposed to JOLTS or
state vacancy reports that directly survey a representative sample of employers. To the
extent that vacancies from certain industries and occupations are less likely to be posted
electronically, as might be the case for many less-skilled jobs, they will be underrepresented
in the data.66 It is also possible that the BG database is not representative even of online job
postings, as comprehensiveness rests on the strength of the company's algorithms to code
information in the ads and get rid of duplicates. Carnevale, Jayasundera, and Repnikov
(2014) show that the occupation-industry composition of the BG data are similar to that
of the Conference Board's HWOL. Moreover, the authors audited a sample of job postings
in the BG database and compared them to the actual text of the postings, ﬁnding that the
codings for occupation, education, experience were at least 80% accurate.67
Figure A1 plots the distribution of BG ads across major industry groups, sorted from
largest to smallest (solid bars), as well as the distribution of job vacancies in JOLTS
(diagonal-lined bars). As mentioned, the BG database is meant to capture only electroni-
cally posted job ads; the universes of the data sources are thus not identical, but JOLTS is
the best comparison available.68 Despite the sample diﬀerences, the industry distributions
65See https://www.conference-board.org/data/helpwantedonline.cfm.
66Rothwell (2014) compares the occupational distributions from an extract of BG to those from state
vacancy surveys for select metropolitan areas for which data are available. He ﬁnds that computer, manage-
ment, and business occupations are overrepresented relative to the state vacancy surveys, while health care
support, transportation, maintenance, sales, and food service workers are underrepresented.
67Furthermore, since BG regularly revises and attempts to improve its algorithms (applying them retroac-
tively on the complete historical database of postings), and our extract is more recent than the one studied
by Carnevale, Jayasundera, and Repnikov, it seems reasonable that their accuracy ﬁgure would be a lower
bound for our sample.
68Both data sets cover 2007 and 20102014 (the most recent full years available from JOLTS at the time
of this writing). The BG distribution is from our primary estimation sample (notably excluding ads with
missing ﬁrms), though we obtain similar results for the distribution across all ads. JOLTS data are based
on a monthly, nationally representative sample of approximately 16,000 business establishments drawn from
unemployment insurance records; they count as a vacancy or job opening any position (including temporary
and seasonal ones) that could start within 30 days and that the employer is actively trying to ﬁll through a
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Figure A1: Industry Distributions: BG, JOLTS: 2007, 2010-2014
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match each other reasonably well. BG is overrepresented in health care and social assistance,
as well as in ﬁnance and insurance and education. It is underrepresented in accommoda-
tion and food services, public administration/government, and construction. However, most
diﬀerences are small in magnitude.
A great advantage of the BG data over the JOLTS is that they allow us to categorize
jobs by occupation at a detailed level. We thus also compare the occupational distribution
of BG job ads to both the stock and ﬂow of employment in the United States. We should
not expect online job ads to precisely match either comparison group since occupations diﬀer
in turnover rates that would necessitate new hires (ﬂows), and since they also diﬀer in the
extent to which they use vacancy postings (rather than informal hiring channels) to ﬁll a
slot. However, these comparisons help build intuition for the BG data set.
Figure A2 plots the distribution of BG ads across major occupation groups, sorted from
largest to smallest (green bars).69 We show the distribution of the stock of employment
based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) data
(light blue, horizontal lines). We also show the occupational distribution of new job starts
(job ﬂows) based on longitudinally linked Current Population Survey (CPS) data (dark blue,
variety of means, of which posting a job ad (electronic or otherwise) is only one.
69For clarity, we use 2-digit Standard Occupational Classiﬁcation codes in the ﬁgure. The regression
analyses use more granular codings.
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Figure A2: Occupation Distributions: BG, New Jobs (CPS) and Employment (OES)
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diagonal lines).70
Perhaps not unexpectedly, BG has a much larger representation of computer and math-
ematical occupations, more than four times the OES and CPS shares. BG is also overrepre-
sented among management, healthcare practitioners, and business and ﬁnancial operations,
although to lesser degrees. On the other hand, BG data are underrepresented in many of
the remaining occupationsfor example, in transportation, food preparation and serving,
production, and construction. The OES and CPS distributions agree more closely, although
there are notable gaps among occupations known to have very high (or very low) rates of
turnover.
A.2 Representativeness of BG Data over Time
As noted in the text, our primary concern is that the representativeness of the sample
changes over time. This would be a threat to internal validity in our analysis. Figure A3
gives a general sense of whether the representativeness of BG has changed over our sample
70All data sets cover 2007 and 20102014. (2014 is the most recent year for which OES data were available
at the time of this writing.) The BG distribution is from our primary estimation sample, though, again, the
distribution is similar for the full sample of ads. We deﬁne a new hire in the CPS as an individual who,
from month t to month t+1, transitioned from non-employment to employment, reported a new employer,
or reported changing occupations.
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Figure A3: Representativeness of BG Occupations, Relative to New Jobs (CPS)
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The x-axis is the BG ad share in an occupation in 2007 minus the CPS new job share in the same occupation in 2007.
The y-axis is these differences for each year from 2010-2015. Darker shades are earlier years, lighter shades are later.
period. On the x-axis we plot the deviation of the BG occupation share in 2007 from that
occupation's share of CPS new job starts in the same year. For example, computer and
mathematical occupations are shown on the far right at roughly 11 percentage points (ppts)
overrepresentation in BG compared to CPS. Construction is on the far left at roughly 7 ppts
underrepresented. On the y-axis we plot the deviation of the BG occupation share from its
CPS share for each of the later years in the data. The markers are color-coded by year.
The darkest markers plot the (2007, 2010) representativeness pair for each occupation; the
lightest markers plot the (2007, 2015) representativeness pair. We also plot the 45-degree
line as a benchmark: if representativeness of the BG data, relative to the CPS, remained
constant over time, all markers should line up on the 45-degree line.
The ﬁgure shows that changes in representativeness over this time period are very small
(most of the markers are close to the 45 degree line). To the extent that changes did occur,
there is a tendency for them to have been in the direction of closer representativeness to the
CPS. Computer and mathematical occupations, management occupations, and architecture
and engineering occupations appear to have become less overrepresented, while health care
and business and ﬁnance look fairly unchanged; administrative support, food, transportation,
and production occupations have become slightly less underrepresented. For most of these
occupations, though, the diﬀerences are quite small.
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A.3 Skills Measures in BG
One of the most unique features of the BG data is the availability of skills measures. We
argue that these stated preferences are informative about labor demand. We have also
investigated, to the best of our ability, the degree to which these stated preferences translate
into realized hires.
Figures A4a and A4b crosscheck the average education requirements in BG with aver-
age education levels of employed workers at the MSA- and occupation-level, respectively.
Using American Community Survey (ACS) data for overlapping sampling years, we rank
both MSAs and occupations (four-digit SOC codes) by their average education of employed
workers and plot the relationships between average education requirements and average ed-
ucation for 20 evenly sized employment bins, using smoothed local linear regression. As can
be seen, at the levels of both MSA and occupation, the probability that an ad posts any
education requirement is increasing with the average years schooling of employed workers
(top left), as is the years of school conditional on any requirement (top right). Furthermore,
the probability that an ad has a high school requirement is positively correlated with the
share of workers that have exactly a high school diploma (bottom left), and the probability
that an ad has a college requirement is positively correlated with the share of workers with
exactly a bachelor's degree (bottom right).
A.4 Compustat Sample
Beginning with the 10,436 ﬁrms used to construct the 20072010 change sample (7.4% of
ﬁrms and 66% of weighted observations, used in ﬁgure 8), we employ a sequential matching
procedure. We ﬁrst match based on exact name, after cleaning to remove punctuation
and words that are sometimes abbreviated (e.g., Inc.). This step accounts for 81% of all
Compustat-matched ﬁrms and 76% of matches based on our sample weights. Second, we use
a fuzzy-match program called Winpure and assign a match if the program determines at least
a 95% probability of a match (5% of matched ﬁrms and matched weighted observations).
Third, we add the sample of ﬁrms matched by Deming and Kahn (2016), which uses only
BG ﬁrms posting in 2014. We thus match a total of 46% of weighted observations from the
20072010 change sample, or 30% of weighted observations in the sample as a wholethough
we did not attempt to match observations that did not meet the 20072010 change criteria.71
71For context, the size of employment in Compustat is roughly half that of total employment in the U.S.
For example, in 2014, the sum of employment listed in companies in Compustat was 70,505,000 and total
payroll employment averaged 139,042,000. The Compustat employment ﬁgure includes both domestic and
foreign workers, with no way to distinguish between the two. However, the employment comparison provides
a useful benchmark.
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Figure A4: Comparison of BG Education Requirements and ACS Employment
(a) by MSA
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B Firm-Occupation Decomposition
The decomposition explored in section 5.1 begins with equation (4), repeated here for con-
venience:
skillmt = p
C
mt
∑
fm∈Ct
∑
o
NCfmt
NCmt
NCofmt
NCfmt
∗ skillCofmt + (1− pCmt)
¯∑
o
NNComt
NNCmt
∗ skillNComt.
Using this equation, we decompose the change in skill requirements in MSA, m from
2007 to year t, into: pCmt, the share of ads in an MSA-year posted in continuing ﬁrms;
NCfmt
NCmt
, the distribution of ads across continuing ﬁrms in mt ;
NCofmt
NCfmt
, the distribution of ads
across occupations for a given continuing ﬁrm; skillCofmt, the average skill requirement for
continuing ﬁrm f , posting in occupation o, MSA m, and year t;
NNComt
NNCmt
, the distribution of ads
across occupations among non-continuing ﬁrms; and ¯skillNComt, the average skill requirement
for occupation o, among all non-continuing ﬁrms in mt (that is, the average skill requirement
in the occupation-MSA-year among ﬁrm-MSAs that posted either only in 2007 or only in
period t).
In practice, this equation is not exact for two reasons. First, continuing ﬁrms do not
necessarily post to the same set of occupations in each period (so skillCofmt would not be de-
ﬁned for some occupation-ﬁrm-MSA-year combinations but might be deﬁned in, say, 2007).
Second, the set of non-continuing ﬁrms does not post to the same set of occupations (so like-
wise ¯skillNComt, which is the average skill requirement among all non-continuing ﬁrms posting
in omt, would not be deﬁned for some occupation-MSA-year combinations). To get around
these issues, we simply aggregate up from the occupation-ﬁrm-MSA-year level to either the
occupation-MSA-year level or the MSA-year level, the point where we get a match.
The exact deﬁnition is shown in equation (5).
(5) skillmt =
pCmt ∗ pic1
∑
fm∈Ct
∑
o∈CO1
skillCO
1
ofmt ∗
NCO
1
ofmt
NCO
1
fmt
NCO
1
fmt
NCO
1
mt
+ pCmt(pi
c
2
∑
o∈CO2
skillCO
2
omt ∗ N
CO2
omt
NCO
1
mt
+ (1− pic1 − pic2) ¯skillCO3mt )
+ (1− pCmt)(pinc1
∑
o∈NCO1
¯skillNCO
1
omt ∗ N
NCO1
omt
NNCO
1
mt
+ (1− pinc1 ) ¯skillNCO2mt )
In the top two lines, we divide the set of ads to continuing ﬁrms into three groups:
occupations that are posted in a given ﬁrm-MSA in both t and in 2007 (the set CO1),
occupations that are not posted in a given ﬁrm-MSA in both periods but are posted among
other continuing ﬁrms in both periods (CO2), and occupations that are posted in one period
by continuing ﬁrms but not in the other period (CO3). The ad shares for these three
groups (pic1, pi
c
2, and 1− pic1− pic2, respectively) sum to one within the set of ads to continuing
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ﬁrms (Ct).
72 Averaging across 20102015 in our data, 54% of weighted observations are to
continuing ﬁrm-MSAs, of which 71% are to continuing occupations (CO1), 28% are to non-
continuing occupations that can still be matched to any other continuing ﬁrms (CO2) and
only 0.8% are to occupations that cannot be matched to any continuing ﬁrms (CO3).
The ﬁrst component, for continuing ﬁrm-occupations (CO1) is straightforward and is
deﬁned by the within ofm average skill requirement (skillCO
1
ofmt), the share of ads in this
occupation, o, for the given fm (
NCO
1
ofmt
NCO
1
fmt
), and the share of all ads in CO1 that are by ﬁrm f ,
(
NCO
1
fmt
NCO
1
mt
). The second components yields the average skill requirement among occupations by
continuing ﬁrms that do not post for the same occupation in both periods. The idea is that
we would like to compare the ﬁrm-occupation-speciﬁc requirement across years. However, in
some cases continuing ﬁrms post in a new occupation in t, so the comparison is not available.
Instead, we simply ﬁx occupations and aggregate over ﬁrms. We can then ask whether skill
requirements are more strenuous for continuing ﬁrms that enter into the occupation, relative
to those that exited the occupation..73 skillCO
2
omt is the average skill requirement in occupation
o among ﬁrm-MSAs that posted some ads in both periods, but posted in occupation o only
in the given period, and
NCO
2
omt
NCO
1
mt
is the ad share for the given occupation among all ads in the
set (CO2). Finally, the third component, ¯skillCO
3
mt , is the average skill requirement in the
MSA-year for ads posted by continuing ﬁrms in occupations that belong to neither CO1 nor
CO2 (that is, an occupation where continuing ﬁrms either post only in 2007 or only in t).
In the third line of equation (5), we divide the set of ads to non-continuing ﬁrms into two
groups: occupations that are posted in the MSA in both t and in 2007 (the set NCO1) and
those that are not (NCO2), with weights pinc1 and 1−pinc1 , respectively. Skill requirements for
the former are a function of the within-occupation average skill requirement among all ads
posted by non-continuing ﬁrms inmt in occupations that can be matched ( ¯skillNCO
1
omt ) and the
share of ads that are posted to occupation o, (
NNCO
1
omt
NNCO
1
mt
). The latter component is the average
skill requirement among ads posted to non-continuing ﬁrms in mt in occupations that cannot
be matched ( ¯skillNCO
2
mt ). Of the 46% of weighted observations that are to non-continuing
ﬁrms in our data, 97.5% of observations belong to the former (matched) group.
As noted in the text, we decompose the change in skill requirements for a given MSA,
m, from 2007 to a given year t (skillmt − skillm07) into these components. We do this by
generating counterfactual diﬀerences that allow one component to change from its level in
72These weights vary by MSA-year, but subscripts are surpressed for clarity.
73We could instead ﬁx ﬁrms and aggregate over occupations. This allows us to ask whether the new
occupations the ﬁrm enters into have diﬀerent skill requirements than the occupations the ﬁrm left. However
this yields far fewer matches, sincce it requires the ﬁrm-MSA to have at least one occupation it posted in
2007 but not t and at least one occupation it posted in t but not 2007. Many ﬁrm-MSAs either cease posting
in some occupations after 2007 or begin posting to new occupations in t, but not both. Instead, aggregating
over ﬁrms and ﬁxing occupations requires that any continuing ﬁrm-MSA ceases posting in the occupation
after 2007 and any continuing ﬁrm-MSA begins posting in the occupation in t.
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2007 to its level in t, holding all other components ﬁxed at the level in either period.74 We
can regress this counterfactual skill change on the Bartik employment shock and the other
controls in equation (1) to understand how much of the total responsiveness is attributed to
a response in the within ﬁrm-MSA skill requirement.
A decomposition begins with skillm07 and generates a counterfactual skill change distri-
bution that allows only one of the components to vary. That component is then ﬁxed at its
value at time t and a second counterfactual skill change distribution is generated by allowing
a second component to vary, keeping all components but the ﬁrst two ﬁxed at their 2007
level. This process continues until all components are at their time t values. We can regress
each counterfactual change on the same variables in equation (1), and the coeﬃcients on
shock ∗ I t will sum to the coeﬃcient on the full change reported earlier.
Naturally the order of the decomposition aﬀects the relative importance of each compo-
nent. For p components in the decomposition, we have p! possible orders. To reduce the state
space, we combine many of the variables in equation (5) into a smaller set of components
since they turn out to be empirically irrelevant.
We reduce the space to six components, resulting in 720 possible permutations. We
estimate each decomposition and summarize results in Appendix table B1. Here we report
the average fraction attributable to a given component, across all decompositions, as well as
the standard deviation. The components are: (1) the share of ads among continuing ﬁrms,
pCmt; (2) the distribution of ads across continuing ﬁrms that post in the same occupation in
both periods,
NCO
1
ofmt
NCO
1
fmt
; (3) the within-ﬁrm-occupation skill requirement for continuing ﬁrms,
skillCO
1
ofmt; (4) the distribution of ads across occupations, which combines
NCO
1
ofmt
NCO
1
fmt
,
NCO
2
omt
NCO
2
mt
,
NNCO
1
omt
NNCO
1
mt
,
pic1, pi
c
2, and pi
nc
1 ; (5) the skill requirement among continuing ﬁrms posting to occupations
they had not previously posted in, which combines skillCO
2
omt and
¯skillCO
3
mt ; and (6) the skill
requirement among non-continuing ﬁrms, which combines ¯skillNCO
1
omt and
¯skillNCO
2
mt . These
diﬀer from the six components listed in the main text in that (4) here combines all occupation-
distribution elements, and we speciﬁcally isolate the change in skill requirements driven by
continuing ﬁrms that move into and out of occupations (5).
74For example, pCmt(pi
c
1
∑
fm∈Ct
∑
o∈CO1
(skillCO
1
ofmt− skillCO
1
ofm07) ∗
NCO
1
ofmt
NCO
1
fmt
NCO
1
fmt
NCO
1
mt
is the change in skill requirements
between 2007 and t, attributed to just changes in the within occupation-ﬁrm-MSA skill requirements among
continuing ﬁrms, holding constant all other components at their levels in t.
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C Alternative Explanations for Upskilling
We explore three possibilities for why ﬁrms may desire to hire more-skilled workers without
otherwise adjusting their production technology: (1) ﬁrms temporarily and opportunistically
seek higher-skilled workers in a slack labor market, (2) replacement hiring diﬀerentially
requires more-skilled workers due to diﬀerential recoveries in quit rates (i.e., the job ladder
needs to clear), and (3) population changes in educational attainment alter the availability
of skill.
C.1 Opportunistic Upskilling
It could be that some ﬁrms always want to hire more-skilled workers, but in a tight labor
market, they cannot attract (or aﬀord) them. In slack economies, ﬁrms may opportunistically
seek out higher-skilled workers. Again, this eﬀect should be temporary, while we ﬁnd that
upskilling is persistent. However, as we have noted, labor markets have been slow to make a
full recovery. To investigate this issue, we compare the upskilling eﬀect across labor markets
where employment shocks more or less severely aﬀected high-skilled workers. If opportunistic
upskilling take place, it should be more likely to occur in MSAs where high-skilled workers
were more severely aﬀected, and thus more readily available to take lower-skilled positions.
We augment equation (1) with controls for the change in the unemployment rate during
the Great Recession among college graduates age 25 or older, obtained from the ACS. As
with the Bartik employment shock, we interact the college unemployment rate shock with
year dummies to allow it to aﬀect changing skill requirements each year. We also norm this
variable so that a one unit change equals the 9010 percentile diﬀerential across MSAs. We
plot both estimates in ﬁgure C1.
First, we note that the overall employment shock and the college unemployment rate
shock are only weakly correlated (r = 0.14). Highly educated MSAs such as New York City
and San Jose/Santa Clara had larger increases in their college unemployment rates, while
MSAs particularly aﬀected by the housing bubble, such as Phoenix, did not.
Holding constant the overall size of the employment shock on an MSA, we ﬁnd that
a larger increase in the college unemployment rate also generates upskilling. In the early
years of the recovery, skill requirements see an additional modest increase that is statistically
signiﬁcant for all skill variables in 2010 and 2011. However, the impact of the college unem-
ployment rate shock dissipates quickly for education, experience and cognitive requirements,
and has converged back to pre-recession levels by 2015. The eﬀect remains signiﬁcant in
2015 only for computer skill requirements. Yet, the eﬀect of the overall employment shock,
holding constant the size of the college graduate unemployment rate shock, remains quanti-
tatively large (and often larger than before), statistically signiﬁcant, and persistent for each
skill type except computer skills.
This set of results has two important implications. First, the impact of the shock to
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Figure C1: Upskilling and the College Unemployment Rate
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college graduates does not persist but fades to pre-recession levels, suggesting that some
opportunistic upskilling may have occurred early in the recovery (Sasser Modestino, Shoag,
and Ballance 2016a, 2016b). Second, and more important, the overall employment shock
induces persistent upskilling, even holding constant the size of the shock to college graduates,
implying that opportunistic upskilling does not drive our main results. The exception is for
computer skills, where it may be diﬃcult to separately identify the overall employment shock
from the college graduate shock, since computer skill increases are likely heavily concentrated
in the most-educated MSAs.75
C.2 Quits and Replacement Hiring
We have argued that the persistence in (ﬁrm-speciﬁc) upskilling is key to disentangling
cyclical explanations from structural ones. However, it could be that cyclical explanations
(such as the bottleneck hypothesis) account for early upskilling and that labor supply factors
drive upskilling later in the period. For example, quits were slow to recover following the
Great Recession. If quit rates among higher-skilled workers recovered more quickly, then
some of the apparently persistent upskilling could be driven by replacement hiring higher up
on the job ladder. Diﬀerences would eventually even out across groups as quit rates among
75We have also examined ﬁrm-level upskilling by the initial skill requirements of the ﬁrm (instead of the
initial change in skill requirements, as above. If opportunistic upskilling is an important part of the story,
we would expect to see increases in skill requirements concentrated among ﬁrms with low or middling initial
levels; however, we ﬁnd no evidence in support of this hypothesis.
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Figure C2: Quit Rates by Date and Education Group
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lower-skilled workers recover.
However, we see no evidence of diﬀerential recovery in quit rates across skill groups. For
instance, in ﬁgure C2 we plot smoothed time series of quit rates by education group from
19982015 using longitudinally-linked CPS data.76 Besides the large and well-known secular
decline in quits (Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak 2013), the ﬁgure shows the quit rate has a
clear cyclical component, declining during NBER-dated recessions (indicated with vertical
dashed lines) and recovering somewhat shortly thereafter. There is certainly no evidence in
this ﬁgure that quit rates for higher-skilled workers (lighter lines) recover more quickly or
become more pronounced later in the recovery than those for lower-skilled workers (darker
lines); in fact, less-educated workers show faster recoveries. It thus seems unlikely that
replacement hiring is driving the persistence in upskilling.
C.3 Educational Attainment
Firms may decide to upskill if they observe that skilled workers have become more plentiful
in their local economy. Indeed, a long line of research has explored whether educational
attainment responds to local labor market conditions. Past evidence generally ﬁnds mod-
76We deﬁne a quit as a worker who reported switching employers between month t and montht + 1 (but
was employed in both months), or one who reported being employed in month t and unemployed in month
t+ 1, and gave voluntary job leaving as a reason for the unemployment. To obtain quit rates we divide the
count of quits by the total number of employed workers in montht.
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erate eﬀects on enrollment, but limited eﬀects on attainment.77 One exception is Charles,
Hurst, and Notowidigdo (2015), who ﬁnd that during the 2000s, the housing boom reduced
educational attainment, primarily on the two-year college margin. This eﬀect (and any sym-
metric rise in attainment when the housing bubble crashed) is less relevant for our sample
of primarily higher-skilled jobs. In particular, the housing boom was a shock principally
aﬀecting low-skilled workers, while the Great Recession was broad-based.78
Using American Community Survey data, we examine the relationship between labor
market conditions and changes in educational attainment across U.S. states, and ﬁnd only
modest eﬀects. We regress state-year educational attainment on state-level Bartik employ-
ment shocks, allowing this shock to interact with year, in a manner analogous to the MSA-
level shocks used in equation (1). We focus on a young population (aged 1832) whose
educational attainment decisions should be most malleable. Our estimates (available upon
request) imply that a state experiencing a Great-Recession-sized shock has no change in
the probability that its young population attains at least some college and a (weakly) lower
probability that it attains at least a bachelor's degree. Thus we conclude that changes in
educational attainment induced by the Great Recession are unlikely to be driving our results.
D Supplemental Figures and Tables
77Card and Lemieux (2001) ﬁnd that local unemployment rates have small, positive impacts on high school
attendance and completion, marginal impacts on college attendance, and no impact on college completion.
Barr and Turner (2015), using more recent data, ﬁnd that college enrollment has grown more responsive to
the business cycle over time. Kahn (2010) ﬁnds that among cohorts graduating from college between 1979
and 1989, those graduating in a worse economy obtained an additional year of graduate school, on average.
She also ﬁnds that economic conditions at time of high school graduation did not aﬀect college completion.
Altonji, Kahn, and Speer (2016) ﬁnd similar modest eﬀects over a broader time period.
78For example, Altonji, Kahn and Speer (2016) show that the Great Recession aﬀected recent college
graduates more severely than past recessions had, and that higher-earning college majors lost much of their
previous advantage in weathering worse labor market entry conditions.
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Figure D1: Impact of MSA-Speciﬁc Employment Shock on Education Requirements
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(b) Experience Requirements
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Figure D2: Upskilling by Sector Tradability, based on Jensen-Kleitzer Oﬀshorability
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Table D2: Probability of Being Missing from a Subsample
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Sample 2007-10 Change Sample Compustat Sample
Shock*2010 -0.0273 -0.0217* 0.0128
(0.0178) (0.0125) (0.0144)
Shock*2011 -0.0299 -0.0119 0.0239*
(0.0184) (0.0118) (0.0139)
Shock*2012 -0.0656*** -0.0151 0.0333**
(0.0195) (0.0118) (0.0159)
Shock*2013 -0.0155 0.00369 0.00888
(0.0202) (0.0115) (0.0107)
Bartiik*2014 0.00305 0.0146 0.0105
(0.0269) (0.0123) (0.0124)
Shock*2015 0.0269 0.000999 -0.00101
(0.0224) (0.0124) (0.0128)
# MSA-year Cells 2,286 2,286 2,286
R2 0.265 0.241 0.594
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Observations are MSA-year cells weighted by the MSA labor force in 2006. Dependent variables are the change from 2007 in 
the share of ads missing from the sample of non-missing firms (column 1), the sample of firms that post at least 5 ads in 2007 and 
2010 conditional on being in the non-missing firm sample (column 2), and the Compustat sample, conditional on being in the 2007-10 
change sample (column 3). Regressions also include year fixed effects and MSA characteristics obtained from the ACS. Standard 
errors are clustered at the MSA level. 
Change in Pr(Missing from):
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